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ARTICLES
EXECUTIVE  TRADE  SECRETS
Tom C.W. Lin*
The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets.  In the eyes of the law, com-
mercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and
nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection
and nondisclosure.  This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal land-
scape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning exec-
utive disclosures—a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors
dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and
institutional stability.
This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public
corporations and the private individuals who manage them, and offers a new way of
thinking about corporate and personal secrets.  This Article conceives the concept of
Executive Trade Secrets as a pragmatic theoretical framework for unlocking this para-
dox of secrets and addressing the challenges surrounding executive disclosures.  This
Article is the first to use trade secrets law to address the interdisciplinary legal issues
surrounding executive disclosures.  It re-conceptualizes private matters of executives as
legally protectable trade secrets by unfolding the hidden symmetry between commercial
secrets and personal secrets.  It reveals Executive Trade Secrets as faithful to the first
principles of the laws of trade secrets, privacy, securities, and corporations, and
explains how such fidelity protects the privacy interests of executives and the corporate
interests of shareholders.  This Article, ultimately, constructs a way to think anew about
executive disclosures and the larger issues at the modern nexus of secrecy, privacy, and
commerce.
 2012 Tom C.W. Lin.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.  Special
thanks to Anita Allen, Stephen Bainbridge, Erwin Chemerinsky, Stuart Cohn, Lisa
Fairfax, Joan Heminway, Roberta Karmel, Claire Kelly, F. Scott Kieff, Kim Lane Schep-
pele, Adam Pritchard, Elizabeth Rowe, Michael Seigel, and participants at the Junior
Faculty Business and Financial Law Workshop at George Washington University’s
Center for Law, Economics & Finance for helpful comments and exchanges; Univer-
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INTRODUCTION
Secrets pose vexing problems for law and society.1  The
WikiLeaks scandal that unfolded in 2010 illustrates the difficulties
concerning secrets in the Information Age.2  Free societies and free
markets generally require openness and transparency.3  But individu-
sity of Florida Levin College of Law for its research support; and Giselle Gutierrez, Jon
Philipson, and Alissa Roland for their excellent research assistance.
1 See generally KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988) (surveying challenging
issues for law and society that arise from secrets); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62
STAN. L. REV. 257, 275–93 (2010) (discussing the social problems of secrecy relating
to utilitarianism, liberalism, and constitutionalism).
2 See Barton Gellman, Julian Assange, TIME, Dec. 27, 2010, at 64 (“The currency
of information, scattered to the four corners of the globe, is roiling not only U.S.
foreign relations but also the alliances and internal politics of other nations.”); Scott
Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (reporting on the consequences of the online publication of a
“cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables”).
3 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[Secrecy] is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a
cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play
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als, states, and firms that inhabit and participate in those free societies
and free markets often desire intimacy and secrecy.4  To satisfy these
divergent goals, the law discriminates among secrets—aiding some to
hide in the dark,5 while pushing others into the light.6
In the context of public corporations, the law facilitates hiding
business secrets but helps expose the secrets of business executives.7
In the eyes of the law, commercial or trade secrets are legitimate
the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.”); COMM’N ON PROTECTING &
REDUCING GOV’T SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xxi (1997) (acknowledging society’s
need for information, suggesting a reduction of secrecy, and noting the benefits of
such actions); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–89
(2006) (“A fundamental attribute of democracy, a norm of human rights, [and] a tool
to promote political and economic prosperity . . . transparency appears to provide
such a remarkable array of benefits . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
4 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 10–23 (2000) (describing the
essential nature of privacy for individuals and societies); SCHEPPELE, supra note 1, at R
301–20 (documenting and theorizing on the legal and social interests of secrets for
various stakeholders); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (expounding on the importance of secrecy in diplomatic affairs); Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890)
(“[N]ow the right to life has come to mean . . . the right to be let alone . . . .”).
5 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (holding
that the law safeguards commercial secrets from corporate espionage); Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The right to be
let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”); Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 539 (1902) (explaining how the law protects a person’s right
“to pass through this world” without his personal affairs being published); Potter
Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (“There is no constitutional
right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness
from the bureaucracy. . . . The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information
Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”).
6 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1979)
(“Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison to publicity, all
other checks are of small account.” (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 524 (London, Hunt, & Clarke 1827))); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67
(1976) (per curiam) (upholding campaign finance disclosure requirements that
exposed “large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity”); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (holding
that the law encourages the press to “bare the secrets of the government and inform
the people”); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 170–76 (2006) (providing various examples
of how courts restrain secrecy).
7 The term, “executive,” hereinafter, refers to senior managers of publicly-traded
firms or firms contemplating a public offering.  Such persons are identified by Rule
16a-1(f) under the Exchange Act as an “officer” of the company. See Exchange Act,
Rule 16a-1(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (2010) (defining terms relevant to Section 16 of
the Exchange Act).
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secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure8 while per-
sonal secrets concerning private facts of executives are not as deserv-
ing of legal protection and nondisclosure.  This discriminatory
treatment of secrets has resulted in a muddled legal landscape of par-
adoxical paths concerning executive disclosures of private informa-
tion—diminishing privacy protections for executives, weakening legal
safeguards for investors, and leaving corporations and investors dan-
gerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market
valuation and institutional stability.
Two prominent episodes involving Apple, one of the most secre-
tive companies in the world,9 and its reclusive former chief executive,
Steve Jobs, illustrate this dangerous discriminatory treatment of
secrets:
The Mysterious Illness.  In the summer of 2008, Steve Jobs’s sickly
appearance at a trade show sent Apple shares moving.10  Apple share-
holders and the marketplace began wondering whether Mr. Jobs’s
pancreatic cancer, for which he was treated in 2004, had returned.11
Apple refused to comment on his health condition, stating that it was
a “private matter.”12  For months, the company’s shares fluctuated
under the uncertainty cast by Mr. Jobs’s health and rumors surround-
ing it.  At various times, Mr. Jobs was reported to have suffered a heart
attack13 or died.14  Finally, in January of 2009, Mr. Jobs told the world
in a letter that he was suffering from a “hormonal imbalance” with a
“relatively simple and straightforward” remedy and that he would
“continue as Apple’s CEO during [his] recovery.”15  About a week
later, Apple announced that he was taking leave from the company
8 For an overview of U.S. trade secrets law, see infra Part III.
9 See Miguel Helft & Nick Bilton, For Apple, Lost iPhone Is a Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2010, at B1 (“The company [Apple] is known as the most secretive in Silicon
Valley, and leaks are rare.”); Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, Apple Obsessed with Secrecy on
Product and Top Executives, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at B1 (“Few companies . . . are
more secretive than Apple.”).
10 See Jobs’s Job, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 68 (discussing the effect of Jobs’s
health on Apple’s financial outlook); Justin Scheck & Ben Charny, Worries Over Jobs’s
Health Weighs on the Stock, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2008, at B2.
11 See Jobs’s Job, supra note 10, at 68; Scheck & Charny, supra note 10, at B2. R
12 See Jobs’s Job, supra note 10, at 68; Scheck & Charny, supra note 10, at B2. R
13 See Seth Liss, Social Media Allows Public to Shape the News, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lau-
derdale), Aug. 16, 2009, at 1F (noting that Apple’s stock price dropped upon false
rumors that Steve Jobs had suffered a heart attack).
14 See Matthew Moore, Steve Jobs’s Obituary Published by Bloomberg, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/26384
81/Steve-Jobs-obituary-published-by-Bloomberg.html.
15 Steve Jobs, Letter from Apple CEO Steve Jobs, APPLE.COM (Jan. 5, 2009), http://
www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/05sjletter.html.
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due to health reasons.16  Following this unexpected announcement
many in the legal and corporate community suggested that Mr. Jobs
and Apple may have violated federal securities law and state corporate
law by not timely disclosing his private health condition to investors,
given his importance to the company.17  Amidst the outcry, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) commenced an investigation
shortly thereafter.18
As a coda, in January 2011, Mr. Jobs once again took medical
leave from Apple under similarly mysterious circumstances without
any meaningful disclosure from Apple or Mr. Jobs to the public.19
Apple shares again dropped precipitously upon the announcement of
his leave.20  In August 2011, in a short letter,21 Mr. Jobs resigned as
chief executive of Apple.22  Shortly after the announcement, Apple
shares dropped 5% during after-hours trading.23  Mr. Jobs would pass
away a few weeks later in early October 2011 at the age of fifty-six.24
The Misplaced iPhone.  In the spring of 2010, an Apple engineer
misplaced a top secret prototype iPhone at a bar.  The phone was sub-
sequently found and sold to the consumer electronic weblog,
Gizmodo.com, which examined it “as if it were an alien from another
planet” and posted numerous images and commentary of the device
for Apple-obsessed consumers and competitors.25  Apple then
16 Yukari Iwatani Kane, Apple’s Jobs Takes Medical Leave, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2009,
at A1.
17 See, e.g., id. at A2 (“Medical and corporate-governance experts earlier this
month had challenged Mr. Jobs’s disclosure about a hormone imbalance as too gen-
eral and had criticized Apple for not providing fuller background on the state of the
CEO’s health.”).
18 See David Scheer & Connie Guglielmo, Apple Disclosures About Jobs Said to Face
SEC Review (Update 4), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDL78iMCdOzk.
19 Miguel Helft, Jobs Takes Sick Leave at Apple Again; Stirs Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2011, at A1.
20 Bloomberg News, Euro Slips Against Dollar, and Futures Lose Ground, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2011, at B7 (“United States stock futures declined abroad after Apple said
that its chief executive, Steve Jobs, was taking a medical leave of absence.”).
21 Steve Jobs, Letter from Steve Jobs, APPLE.COM (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.apple.
com/pr/library/2011/08/24Letter-from-Steve-Jobs.html.
22 David Streitfeld, Jobs Steps Down at Apple, Saying He Cannot Meet Duties, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A1.
23 Id.
24 See John Markoff, Apple’s Visionary Redefined Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011,
at A1.
25 See Helft & Bilton, supra note 9, at B1 (describing the alleged iPhone and the R
events preceding the finding of the phone).
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reported the phone stolen.26  The blogger in possession of the phone
subsequently returned it after Mr. Jobs and Apple’s general counsel
contacted him.27  Following the phone’s return, a special task force of
armed police officers and investigators broke down the front door of
the home of Gizmodo’s editor and confiscated several personal items
in connection with the misplaced phone.28  The iPhone 4—the ulti-
mate iteration of the misplaced prototype—was launched in the sum-
mer of 2010 and became the most successful product launch for
Apple.29  In just three days, over 1.7 million units were sold.30  While
some questioned Apple’s heavy-handed tactics,31 few legal commenta-
tors disputed that Apple had a right to protect the secrets of its
iPhone prototype.32
In sum, these two episodes, the Mysterious Illness and the Misplaced
iPhone, highlight the contrasting legal treatments and perceptions of
business secrets and the secrets of business people.  While Mr. Jobs’s
refusal to reveal his private medical secrets incited an SEC investiga-
tion, Apple’s aggressive (and armed) defense of its product secrets
garnered understanding.  The law must better address this divergent
treatment of secrets as private lives of executives continue to attract
more public attention.
26 See Connie Guglielmo & Joel Rosenblatt, Apple’s Jobs Asked Gizmodo to Return
‘Stolen’ iPhone (Update 1), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-05-14/apple-s-jobs-asked-gizmodo-to-return-stolen-iphone-court-doc-
uments-show.html (discussing Gizmodo’s refusal to return the phone until Apple
claimed ownership of it).
27 See Brian Lam, A Letter: Apple Wants Its Secret iPhone Back, GIZMODO.COM (Apr.
19, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5520479/a-letter-apple-wants-its-secret-
iphone-back (displaying Apple’s letter to Gizmodo requesting the return of its
phone).
28 See Lost iPhone Investigation (UPDATED): Gizmodo Editor Jason Chen’s Home
Searched and Computers Seized, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2010/04/26/jason-chen-gizmodo-editor_n_552572.html#s85104
(chronicling a first-hand account of the police’s unique and aggressive search and
seizure of the blogger’s property).
29 See iPhone 4 Sales Top 1.7 Million, APPLE.COM (June 28, 2010), http://www.
apple.com/pr/library/2010/06/28iphone.html (“‘This is the most successful prod-
uct launch in Apple’s history,’ said Steve Jobs . . . .”).
30 See id. (describing the instant success of the iPhone 4).
31 See Kim Zetter, Expert: Invalid Warrant Used in Raid on iPhone Reporter’s Home,
WIRED (Apr. 26, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/i
phone-raid/ (discussing the invalidity of the warrant to search the blogger’s home
because of federal laws prohibiting the seizure of certain materials from journalists).
32 See Guglielmo & Rosenblatt, supra note 26 (noting that Apple’s sales may be R
harmed by the publication of details of the phone and its features).
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This Article explores this divergent and paradoxical treatment of
secrets, in the context of public firms and the private individuals who
manage them, and introduces the concept of Executive Trade Secrets as
a pragmatic theoretical framework for executives, investors, and regu-
lators to address and to think anew about executive disclosures of pri-
vate facts.  This Article is the first to use trade secrets law to address
the difficult interdisciplinary legal issues surrounding executive disclo-
sures.33  This Article aims to reveal that the secrets of the Mysterious
Illness are much like the secrets of the Misplaced iPhone, that some per-
sonal secrets of executives are like the commercial secrets of the busi-
nesses they manage.  Both are worthy of legal protection and
nondisclosure.  Executive Trade Secrets, as conceived here, will
change conventional understandings of executive disclosures,34
strengthen privacy protections for executives, and further the corpo-
rate interests of shareholders.  Ultimately, it will offer a new way to
think about executive disclosures and the larger issues at the modern
nexus of privacy, secrecy, and commerce.
It should be noted upfront that this Article does not intend to
create a heroic construct to shield all private information of execu-
tives from public disclosure, nor does it intend to elevate the privacy
rights of executives.  Instead, this Article inquires into the legal para-
33 The author and others have previously documented this problem concerning
disclosures of material, private facts pursuant to securities law. See, e.g., Patricia
Sa´nchez Abril & Ann M. Olaza´bal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the Intersec-
tion of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545, 1581–96 (2010) (discussing
the obligations and constraints on disclosure of private information under federal
securities laws); Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307, 327–28
(1996) (reviewing CONNIE BRUCK, MASTER OF THE GAME (1994)) (proposing a proto-
col for disclosing a CEO’s medical problems); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha’s
(and Steve’s) Good Faith: An Officer’s Duty of Loyalty at the Intersection of Good Faith and
Candor, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 111, 118 (2009) (discussing whether a cor-
porate officer’s duty of good faith extends to public disclosures of private matters);
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored
Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749,
749–52 (2007) (recommending disclosure reforms relating to personal facts of execu-
tives); Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corpo-
ration Obligated to Disclose that Illness and Should the Securities and Exchange Commission
Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 827 (2009); Tom C.W. Lin,
Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives, 11 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 383 (2009) (offering a model approach for disclosing material, private
matters); Peter O’Shea, Comment, Loyalty and Care Personified: Martha Stewart’s Duty to
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1150–55 (2010) (argu-
ing that the duty of loyalty has expanded into the personal lives of corporate officers).
34 The term, “executive disclosure,” hereinafter refers to the disclosure of poten-
tially material, private matters pursuant to corporate and securities law, unless other-
wise indicated.
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dox between business secrets and secrets of business people, and it
reveals the hidden symmetry of both types of secrets and key implica-
tions uncovered by this revelation.
This Article proceeds with this revelation in five parts.  Part I
starts with an exposition of the laws of corporate secret-telling.  It
begins by documenting the disclosure requirements of firms and exec-
utives under federal securities law.35  It then explicates on the rise of
executives and the fall of their privacy.36
Part II exposes how the secrets of executives are shielded from
the public and shown to the public.  It commences with an explora-
tion of the legal tensions arising out of executive disclosures by trav-
ersing the main fault lines at the nexus of securities law, corporate
law, and privacy law.37  It then examines the inconsistent executive
disclosure practices of firms, as a symptom of these tensions and the
lack of a workable legal framework.38
Part III begins laying the foundation for creating a pragmatic the-
oretical framework for resolving the paradox of secrets between com-
mercial secrets and executive secrets.  It does so by surveying the
smoother terrain of trade secrets law, describing how trade secrets law
protects the secrets of businesses, and highlighting the importance of
trade secrets to commerce.39
Building on the foundation of existing trade secrets law, Part IV
introduces the concept of Executive Trade Secrets as the key to
unlocking the paradox of secrets and addressing problematic issues of
executive disclosures.40  It re-conceptualizes certain private matters of
executives as legally protectable trade secrets by revealing the hidden
symmetry between the commercial secrets of businesses and the per-
sonal secrets of executives.  Part IV also studies how Executive Trade
Secrets is faithful to the first principles of the laws of trade secrets,
privacy, securities, and corporations.  It proceeds to reveal how such
fidelity creates a pragmatic, interdisciplinary legal framework for exec-
utives, investors, and regulators to think anew about executive disclo-
sure.  To explicate further on the concept of Executive Trade Secrets,
Part IV closes with an examination of the inelegant—but instructive—
political analogue of executive privilege.41
35 See infra Part I.A–B.
36 See infra Part I.C.
37 See infra Part II.A–C.
38 See infra Part II.D.
39 See infra Part III.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 See infra Part IV.D.
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Part V explores three key implications arising out of the concept
of Executive Trade Secrets.42  First, it addresses whether such a con-
ception creates a benign shield to protect or a malignant shield to
hide.43  Second, Part V suggests that executive disclosure operating
within the Executive Trade Secrets framework can lead to better exec-
utive pools and more public firms.44  Third, it discusses how such a
conception of personal secrets as trade secrets coincides with and
resides within the modern trend of privacy commoditization.45
Finally, this Article closes with a brief conclusion.
I. PUBLIC FIRMS AND PRIVATE MANAGERS
The public corporation is one of the greatest inventions of man-
kind—an engine for the energy and ingenuity of entrepreneurs, a
vehicle for incredible wealth-creation and innovation.46  In America,
in exchange for access to public funds, firms relinquish certain secrets
of their affairs to the world.47  Those secrets include information
about the firms themselves and the individuals who serve as their exec-
utives.  This information comes into the light through a regulatory
framework established by securities regulation and corporate law.
A. The Disclosure Obligations of Public Firms
The federal securities regulatory framework was built on the prin-
ciple of public disclosure.48  The Securities Act of 193349 (the Securi-
42 See infra Part V.
43 See infra Part V.A.
44 See infra Part V.B.
45 See infra Part V.C.
46 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 21 (1917) (“[T]he limited liability corporation is the greatest single dis-
covery of modern times . . . . ” (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia
Univ., Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911))); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE,
THE COMPANY xv (2003) (“[The corporation is] the basis of the prosperity of the West
and the best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”).
47 In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964) (“An insider of a corporation
that is asking the public for funds must, in return, relinquish various areas of
privacy.”).
48 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77aa (2006)).  The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is “to provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign com-
merce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other
purposes.”  SEC v. Searchlight Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 112 F. Supp. 726 (D.
Nev. 1953). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
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ties Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 193450 (the Exchange
Act) serve as the legal bases of that framework.  Firms that choose to
make public offerings of securities in the U.S. capital markets must
comply with the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.51  Despite the recent financial crisis,52 the U.S. capital
markets remain one of the largest pools of capital for firms.53  Absent
proper compliance, the SEC can restrict a firm’s access to the U.S.
capital markets.54  Absent access to such funding, firms would have to
incur significant costs in raising capital for future investments, talent
retention, and ongoing operations.55  Therefore, many businesses
aspire to become public firms and, thus, comply with the disclosure
requirements of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.56
(1963) (stating that federal securities regulation “substitute[s] a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”).
49 15 U.S.C. § 77 (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat.
74).
50 Id. § 78 (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch, 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881).
51 See supra notes 49–50. R
52 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011)
(studying the recent financial crisis); Tom C.W. Lin, Too Big to Fail, Too Blind to See, 80
MISS. L.J. 355, 355–67 (2010) (reviewing ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL
(2009)) (summarizing key episodes of the recent financial crisis).
53 See, e.g., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 9 (2009) (graphing
the value of U.S. capital markets at the end of 2008), available at http://www.mckin-
sey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/gcm-sixth-annual-report/gcm_sixth_annual_report_full_
report.pdf.
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(k); see also Whispering Oaks Int’l, Inc., d/b/a BioCurex,
Inc., Trading Suspension, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49546 (Apr. 8, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/34-49546.htm (announcing the tem-
porary suspension of trading of the securities of Whispering Oaks International, Inc.,
d/b/a BioCurex, Inc.).
55 During the recent financial crisis, many firms like the three largest domestic
automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler—became paralyzed by the lack of
liquidity in the credit and commercial paper markets.  As access to such public capital
became more expensive and difficult to obtain, many firms faced the prospects of
temporary shutdowns and bankruptcies. See, e.g., STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL 1–32,
100–15 (2010) (chronicling the dire straits of domestic automakers as a result of the
financial crisis); Jim Henry, Credit Freeze Plunges Detroit 3 into Cash Crisis, FIN. WEEK,
Sept. 29, 2008, ¶ 20, available at http://www.financialweek.com/article/20080929/
REG/809299985/-1/FWDailyAlert01 (“[S]ome analysts wonder whether the domestic
automakers can hang on until then [2010] without running out of cash.”).
56 See, e.g., JASON DRAHO, THE IPO DECISION 2–5 (2004) (noting the large num-
ber of initial public offerings in the United States and abroad over the last four
decades); Jason Zweig, The Demise of the IPO—and Ideas on How to Revive It, WALL ST. J.
(June 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704569204575328
784069347058.html (stating that there were more than 6000 publicly-traded compa-
nies in 2009 despite a significant decline over the previous decade); see also Eric L.
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The Securities Act requires the registration of any offering or sale
of securities using the “means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce.”57  The Securities Act,
through the registration process and its antifraud provisions,58
attempts to ensure that investors receive accurate information about
firms and the securities being offered to the public.  The Securities
Act mandates compliance with rules concerning certain line-item dis-
closures59 and narrative disclosures.60  For example, when Google
decided to take itself public, it was required to disclose in its registra-
tion statement its contractual obligations, pursuant to the mandatory
line-item disclosure requirements,61 and its significant risks, pursuant
to the narrative disclosure requirements.62
To complement the Securities Act, which governs the issuance of
securities, the Exchange Act governs the subsequent trading of those
securities.63  The Exchange Act, through its broad antifraud provision
in Section 1064 and its periodic reporting requirements,65 attempts to
ensure that investors in secondary markets for securities receive accu-
rate information about such securities and their underlying firms.
As a result of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, firms
are required to make timely disclosures and periodically update them
for the “proper protection of the investors and to insure fair dealing
in the security.”66  These timely disclosures occur at minimum on a
quarterly basis67 and consist of information such as a firm’s financial
data,68 its material legal proceedings,69 and the professional back-
Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1694 n.167 (2006) (noting that there are “well over 10,000” publicly traded firms).
57 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1).
58 See id. §§ 77k, 77q, 77l.
59 See id. § 77aa (setting forth the various line-item disclosures that are required
for inclusion in the disclosure statement).
60 See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2010) (setting forth the required narrative disclosures).
61 Google Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Amend-
ment No. 9 to Form S-1) (Aug. 18, 2004) at 66, available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/google/ipo/ds1.pdf.
62 Id.
63 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–mm.
64 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (outlining SEC Rule 10b-5).
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (requiring companies to “keep reasonably current
the information and documents required to be included in or filed with an applica-
tion or registration statement”).
66 Id. § 78m.
67 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13.
68 Id. § 229.301.
69 Id. § 229.103.
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ground of its key executives.70  Because of the expansion and diversifi-
cation of the investor base, the SEC generally has favored more
disclosure as a means to protect less sophisticated investors.71
B. Disclosure Obligations Relating to Executives
In connection with their disclosure obligations, firms are
required to disclose certain private information related to their execu-
tives in public filings to the SEC.  Regulation S-K, specifically Items
401 through 404, provides instruction and guidance on such execu-
tive disclosures.72
First, Item 401 requires firms to disclose the identity, age, and the
preceding five years of business background of their executives.73
Additionally, firms are mandated to disclose family relationships
between or amongst the executives and other officers of the firm,74
and legal proceedings involving an executive during the preceding
ten years “that are material to an evaluation of the [executive’s] ability
or integrity.”75  These legal proceedings include sensitive matters like
personal bankruptcy filings and criminal proceedings, which are
directly related to the firm.76  Second, Item 402 requires firms to dis-
close and discuss their compensation to their executives.77  This
includes monetary and nonmonetary compensation.78  Third, Item
403 requires firms to disclose the ownership of securities by their exec-
utives in the firm.79  For example, Berkshire Hathaway is required to
disclose the number of company shares owned by its chief executive
officer, Warren Buffett.  Finally, Item 404 requires firms to disclose
transactions between the firm and its executives that exceed
$120,000.80
In addition to the disclosure requirements articulated by Regula-
tion S-K, the antifraud and gap-filling provisions under the Securities
70 Id. § 229.401(e)(1).
71 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–27 (1953) (holding that
the purpose of federal securities legislation is to protect unsophisticated investors “by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions”).
72 17 C.F.R. § 229.401–404.
73 Id. §§ 229.401(a), 229.401(e).
74 Id. § 229.401(d).
75 Id. § 229.401(f).
76 Id.
77 Id. § 229.402.
78 Id.
79 Id. § 229.403.
80 Id. § 229.404.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-APR-12 10:47
2012] executive  trade  secrets 923
Act and the Exchange Act also mandate disclosures relating to execu-
tives.  For example, Rule 408 of Regulation C under the Securities Act
mandates that “[i]n addition to the information expressly required to
be included in a registration statement, there shall be added such fur-
ther material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading.”81  This gap-filling rule is intended to
capture disclosures that are not specifically delineated by Regulation
S-K.
Similarly, Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act makes it unlawful
“[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity.”82  The antifraud provisions, especially Rule 10b-5, compel addi-
tional executive disclosures because courts have vastly expanded Rule
10b-5’s scope, and plaintiffs’ lawyers have greatly increased their utili-
zation of it as a basis for securities litigation.83
C. The Rise of Executives/The Fall of Executive Privacy
In the decades since the creation of the SEC, the influence of
firms on economic life has grown exponentially,84 and so too, has the
influence of the executives who manage them.85  The rise of execu-
tives during this period has been fueled, in part, by two
macroeconomic trends: (1) an expansion and diversification of inves-
tors86 and (2) advances in information technology.87  The confluence
81 Id. § 230.408(a).
82 Id. § 240.10b-5.
83 See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818–35 (2002) (noting that Section
10b should be construed flexibly); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise
and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359,
367–70 (1995) (discussing the breadth in application of Rule 10b-5); William K.S.
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217,
1217–71 (1981) (explicating on the increase of Rule 10b-5 actions).
84 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–2 (2002)
(stating that corporate firms are the dominant form of business organizations and
account for an overwhelming majority of all economic revenue).
85 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987,
987–95 (2010) (alluding to the enormous influence of CEOs and predicting a decline
in their influence); Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV 351, 354–57 (2011) (discussing the wide spheres of influence of
prominent corporate executives).
86 See, e.g., Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1551 (citing “higher investment by R
average folk” as a cause of celebrity CEOs); Lin, supra note 33, at 389–92 (discussing R
the expansion and diversification of the investor base in America).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 14 20-APR-12 10:47
924 notre dame law review [vol. 87:3
of these two macroeconomic trends has resulted in an appreciation of
executives in the socioeconomic hierarchy and a depreciation of their
individual privacy.
Over the last few decades, the number of institutions and individ-
uals investing directly or indirectly in the stock market has grown
exponentially.88  In the 1920s, approximately twenty million individ-
ual investors existed.89  Today, more than half of all U.S. households
are invested in the stock market in one form or another.90  This
expansion of investors coincided with a diversification of investors.  A
greater number of less wealthy and less financially-sophisticated indi-
viduals became investors.91
These individual investors, and some institutional investors, often
viewed executives as doppelgangers of their firms.92  The executive
87 See, e.g., Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1552–53 (explicating on the R
proliferation of business news); Lin, supra note 33, at 392 (explicating on the growth R
of business media); Press Release No. 2008-158, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Pro-
vides Guidance to Open Up Use of Corporate Web Sites for Disclosures to Investors
(July 30, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release, SEC], available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-158.htm (“Ongoing developments in technology have
increased both the markets’ and investors’ demand for more timely company disclo-
sure on the Web . . . .” (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox)).
88 See JOINT ECON. COMM., THE ROOTS OF BROADENED STOCK OWNERSHIP 1 (2000),
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/stock/stock.htm (“Recent data released by
the Federal Reserve shows that nearly half of all U.S. households are stockholders.”);
Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 1–29 (2000); John Sabelhaus et al.,
Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet in 2011, 19
INVESTMENT CO. INST. 1 (2011) (showing that an estimated 45.3% of U.S. households
owned mutual funds in 2011 compared to 5.7% in 1980).
89 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated Oct. 24, 2011) (“During the 1920s, approxi-
mately 20 million large and small shareholders took advantage of post-war prosperity
and set out to make their fortunes in the stock market.”).
90 See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 88, at 1 (“Recent data released by the Fed- R
eral Reserve shows that nearly half of all U.S. households are stockholders.”).
91 See, e.g., Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1551 (discussing “higher levels of R
investment by average folk” in the stock market in recent years); David Barboza, Why
Big Firms are Courting Day Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at C1 (reporting on the
large number of individual investors who trade online).
92 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 33, at 393–94 (“It would be hard for one to imagine R
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia without Martha Stewart, Apple without Steve Jobs,
Starbucks without Howard Schultz, or Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett.
Consequentially, it would be hard—rightly or wrongly—for one to imagine the con-
tinued success of these companies without their founders or CEOs.” (citations omit-
ted)); Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at C1 (discussing
the indispensible nature of Steve Jobs in the eyes of Apple investors).
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became a primary factor, if not the primary factor, in an investor’s
investment calculus.93  Many modern executives, especially chief exec-
utive officers, are perceived not as temporary stewards of business
enterprises, but as saviors of industry, alter-egos of firms, and celebri-
ties of society.94
Many CEOs, in particular, became their respective firm’s most
valuable asset in the eyes of investors and their boards of directors.95
This exalted view is evidenced, in part, by an unparalleled increase in
executive compensation over the last few decades.96  For just the
eight-year period between 1992 and 2000 alone, “the average real
(inflation-adjusted) pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) of S&P 500
firms more than quadrupled, climbing from $3.5 million to $14.7 mil-
lion.”97  After a slight decline during the height of the financial crisis
in 2008 and 2009, executive compensation bounced back in 2010.98
93 See GIDEON HAIGH, FAT CATS 98 (2005) (“A . . . survey found that 95 percent of
respondents were influenced in stock selection by the CEO’s profile and reputa-
tion.”); Eduardo Porter, How Superstars’ Pay Stifles Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2010, at B4 (“As corporations have increased in size, management decisions at the top
have become that much more important, measured in terms of profits or losses.”).
94 See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 51–81 (2002) (docu-
menting the rise of the “charismatic CEO”); JEFFREY SONNENFELD, THE HERO’S FARE-
WELL 5–10 (1988) (explicating the view of corporate executives as “mythical heroes”);
Adam Lashinsky, The Decade of Steve, FORTUNE, Nov. 23, 2009, at 93 (calling Steve Jobs
of Apple “the rare businessman with legitimate worldwide celebrity”). Contra Harris
Collingwood, Do CEOs Matter, ATLANTIC, June 2009, at 54–59 (questioning the value of
large company CEOs).
95 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 33, at 120 (“The press builds these executives R
up and, when provoked, tears them down, in each case reinforcing public notions
(accurate and inaccurate) that shareholder value is tied to the executives’ every
move.” (footnote omitted)); Lashinsky, supra note 94, at 93 (noting the unique value R
of Steve Jobs to Apple). But see Stanley Lieberson & James F. O’Connor, Leadership
and Organizational Performance: A Study of Large Corporations, 37 AM. SOC. REV. 117
(1972) (theorizing that the CEOs are not as valuable to their firms as may be believed
by investors).
96 See, e.g., HAIGH, supra note 93, at 11 (“CEO compensation in the U.S. surged R
. . . another 535 percent in the 1990s.”); Porter, supra note 93, at B4 (“A study of pay R
in the 1970s found that executives in the top ten percent made about twice as much
as those in the middle of the pack.  By the early 2000s, the top suits made more than
four times the pay of the executives in the middle.”); Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie
Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2006) (noting the rise of
executive perks).
97 LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 1 (2004).
98 Daniel Costello, The Drought Is Over (at Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2011, at BU1.
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“The median pay for top executives at 200 major companies was $9.6
million [in 2010],” which was “a twelve percent increase over 2009.”99
The elevated pedestal of the modern executive coupled with a
larger and more diverse investor base resulted in greater demand for
information about executives.  This greater demand was met by a mar-
ketplace more than willing to satisfy it with advances in information
technology.100  Today, countless sources exist for business information
spanning all types of media, from radio to television to websites to
blogs to tweets to smartphone applications that are dedicated prima-
rily to gathering business information—which encompasses every-
thing from financial data to personal tidbits about executives.101
The confluence of a high demand for executive information and
advances in information technology that sought to satisfy that demand
has diminished the privacy of executives.102  This is evidenced, in part,
by intimate revelations about prominent executives over the last dec-
ade.  In 2000, the business press reported on Warren Buffett’s surgery
to remove benign polyps from his colon.103  In 2001, the world was
made privy to a personal investment of Martha Stewart, the ubiquitous
CEO of her namesake firm.104  In 2004 and 2005, the media reported
on the health conditions of two successive CEOs of McDonald’s, both
of whom passed away for health reasons (unrelated to the company’s
products, as the company noted).105  In 2007, a spotlight was shone
99 Id.
100 See HAIGH, supra note 93, at 97 (“New business media, like CNNfn, CNBC, and R
Bloomberg Television, seemed to be willing the market higher on behalf of the eager
new investment generation.”); Press Release, SEC, supra note 87 (“Ongoing develop- R
ments in technology have increased both the markets’ and investors’ demand for
more timely company disclosure on the Web, and in turn, raised new securities law
issues for public companies to consider.” (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox)).
101 Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1552–53 (discussing the proliferation of R
media dedicated to business information).
102 See Heminway, supra note 33, at 120 (“With our current information-over- R
loaded society, the corporate and personal lives of founding and otherwise iconic
executives—like Martha Stewart and Steve Jobs—are far more public.”).
103 See Jobs’s Job, supra note 10, at 68. R
104 See United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The
criminal charges against Stewart . . . arose from Stewart’s December 27, 2001 sale of
3,928 shares of stock in ImClone Systems, Inc . . . .”).
105 See, e.g., Margaret Webb Pressler, McDonald’s CEO Dies at 60, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2004, at E1 (covering the death of McDonald’s CEO, James Cantalupo, due to a
heart attack from stress, as suggested by the company); Leslie Wayne & Eric Dash,
Citing Cancer, Chief Resigns at McDonald’s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at C1 (reporting
on the resignation of Charles H. Bell as “chief executive . . . to devote all of his time
and energy to his courageous battle against cancer” (quoting McDonald’s Chairman
Andrew J. McKenna)).
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on the sex life of British Petroleum’s then CEO, Lord John Browne,
who was forced to resign after a British tabloid publicized his secret
affair with a male companion.106  That same year the media also
uncovered the online habits of Whole Foods CEO, John Mackey, who
thrashed competitors in chat rooms using an alias.107  In 2008, the
media delved into the drug use and sexual peccadilloes of former
Broadcom CEO, Henry Nicholas, who had an affinity for prostitutes,
drugs, and secret lairs.108  During the recent financial crisis, the golf
scores and outings of one Wall Street executive were made public.109
During the British Petroleum oil crisis in 2010,110 its then CEO, Tony
Hayward, was reported to be fraternizing with a woman, who was not
his wife;111 and Hewlett Packard’s former CEO, Mark Hurd, was
ousted from his position and investigated for actions stemming from a
106 See Alex MacDonald et al., BP’s CEO to Resign Immediately Amid Revelations of
Private Life, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, available at http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/
group/safepipelines/message/10107 (“The storied tenure of John Browne, the CEO
who turned BP PLC into one of the world’s most-valuable oil companies, came to an
unceremonious end today, after a British court allowed a U.K. newspaper group to
publish a set of articles about the executive’s long relationship with a young man.”).
107 See David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Sets Probe As CEO Apologizes, WALL ST. J., July
18, 2007, at A3 (“Whole Foods Chairman and Chief Executive John Mackey apolo-
gizes for ‘error in judgment’ in posting anonymous messages to Internet stock forums
lauding Whole Foods and disparaging rival Wild Oats Markets for roughly eight
years.”).
108 See Bethany McLean, Dr. Nicholas and Mr. Hyde: Sex, Lies, and Underground Lairs,
VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2008, at 216 (investigating “allegations about Nicholas’s out-of-con-
trol world: the parade of prostitutes, the spiking of clients’ drinks with Ecstasy, and
the secret lair he built underneath the Orange County mansion he shared with his
wife and kids”).
109 In 2007, Dealbreaker.com posted the golf outings and scores of then Merrill
Lynch CEO, Stanley O’Neal. See Bess Levin, Stan O’Neal Has Got His Priorities Straight,
DEALBREAKER.COM (Oct. 26, 2007, 2:37 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2007/10/stan-
oneal-has-got-his-priorities-straight/.
110 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Oil Spill’s Blow to BP’s Image May Eclipse Out-of-Pocket
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B1 (“BP says that the offshore drilling accident that
is spewing thousands of barrels of oil a day into the Gulf of Mexico could cost the
company several hundred million dollars.”); Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman,
Days After Rig Explosion, Well Is Pouring Thousands of Gallons of Oil into Gulf, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2010, at A11 (reporting on the “about 42,000 gallons of oil a day pouring into
the Gulf of Mexico” that resulted from the sunken BP oil rig).
111 See Adrian Chen, Tony Hayward Gets Full-On TMZ Treatment, GAWKER.COM (July
10, 2010), http://gawker.com/5583933/tony-hayward-gets-the-full+on-tmz-treatment;
TMZ Staff, Tony Hayward – Fish and Chicks, TMZ (July 10, 2010), http://www.tmz.
com/2010/07/09/tony-hayward-houston-bar-fish-chips-woman-b-p-british-petroleum-
seafood-photo-picture-receipt/.
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personal relationship with a female independent contractor in
2010.112
In an age where anyone with a phone can record news and any-
one with a computer can “report news” on a global scale,113 the
penumbra of privacy114 has shrunken for all private individuals.  This
is especially true for prominent figures like executives who are
entrusted with the public’s money.115  Some executives simply have
accepted their diminished privacy as a price of their positions and the
modern media culture.  For example, in discussing contemporary pri-
vacy norms, Scott McNealy, the former CEO of Sun Microsystems,
famously declared, “Privacy is dead.  Get over it.”116 Others, like Mr.
Jobs, believed that managing a public firm in the modern era does not
necessarily mean a wholesale abdication of personal privacy.117
Regardless of the divergent executive views, the modern reality is that
while their influence has increased, the privacy of executives has
diminished.
112 See Ashlee Vance, S.E.C. Is Investigating Hurd’s Departure as Chief of H.P., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at B4 (reporting that Hewlett Packard and its former CEO,
Mark Hurd, were being investigated by the SEC for actions relating to an inappropri-
ate personal relationship).
113 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 3.0, at 176–79 (2007) (opin-
ing on how the Internet has facilitated the global exchange of information at unparal-
leled velocity and volume); Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Whole World is Watching,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A23 (“[E]veryone is a reporter and can talk back and be
heard globally.”).
114 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[There exists a]
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
115 See Friedman, supra note 113 (“When everyone has a blog, a MySpace page or R
Facebook entry, everyone is a publisher.  When everyone has a cellphone with a cam-
era in it, everyone is a paparazzo.  When everyone can upload video on YouTube,
everyone is filmmaker.  When everyone is a publisher, paparazzo or filmmaker, every-
one else is a public figure.  We’re all public figures now.”).  The privacy rights of
public figures are generally analyzed under the rubric articulated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (apply-
ing “the New York Times standard” for public officials to public figures).
116 See GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION 78 (James B. Rule & Graham Greenleaf eds.,
2008); see also Alex Crippen, Warren Buffett: Apple Withheld “Material Fact” on Steve Jobs,
CNBC (June 24, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/31526814 (“If I have any serious
illness, or something coming up of an important nature . . . I think the thing to do is
just tell . . . the Berkshire shareholders about it. . . . Some people might think I’m
important to the company. . . . So it’s a material fact. . . . [S]o I think that’s important
to get out.  They’re going to find out about it anyway so I don’t see a big privacy issue
or anything of the sort.” (quoting Warren Buffett)).
117 See Nocera, supra note 92, at C1 (alluding to Steve Jobs’s strong desires to R
protect his personal privacy).
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Part I discussed the laws of corporate secret-telling, namely the
disclosure obligations under federal securities laws, and perceptions
about executives and their privacy.  Next, Part II will examine the
legal tensions that arise in disclosing the secrets of executives, and
how those tensions lead to inconsistent practices.
II. LEGAL TENSIONS & INCONSISTENT PRACTICES
A long held legal axiom is that “[a]n insider of a corporation that
is asking the public for funds must, in return, relinquish various areas
of privacy” in his life.118  However, the law has never clearly defined
the terms of that bargain.  This ambiguity has created tensions
between an executive’s desires for privacy and the crosscutting obliga-
tions of securities law, corporate law, and privacy law.119  As a result,
firms have engaged in inconsistent practices when it comes to the dis-
closure of material, private matters of executives.
A. Tensions Under Federal Securities Law
Legal tensions arise when securities law’s principle of “full disclo-
sure”120 clashes with the human desires for secrecy and privacy.121
Current federal securities law offers no clear guidance on the disclo-
sure of an executive’s material, private matters.122  Aside from the
118 In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964).
119 See, e.g., Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 771 (“Rights to privacy . . .
are implicated in and challenged by disclosures compelled under federal securities
law.”); Andrew K. Glenn, Note, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities
Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hobson’s Choice or Business Necessity?,
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 537, 541–44 (1994) (explicating on the contradictions of privacy
rights protections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and federal securities
law).
120 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stat-
ing that the objective of securities regulation is to “substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
705 (1980) (noting that securities legislation should be construed flexibly to effectu-
ate their remedial purposes of protecting investors).
121 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“[Privacy is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”); ROSEN, supra note 4, at 11 (“Privacy is necessary for the formation of R
intimate relationships, allowing us to reveal parts of ourselves to friends, family mem-
bers, and lovers that we withhold from the rest of the world.”).
122 See Barnard, supra note 33, at 323 (“The law governing a corporation’s affirma- R
tive obligation to disclose an executive’s medical condition is unclear.  Federal law
does not require companies to make timely disclosure of executive illness.”); Hemin-
way, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 774 (“Unfortunately, current federal securities
disclosure rules do not apparently recognize the tension they create with privacy
rights or provide a concrete basis or process for performing the requisite balancing of
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mandated line-item disclosures under Regulation S-K,123 much of the
disclosure relating to executives is driven by gap-filling and antifraud
rules that require the disclosure of all “material” information.124  The
Supreme Court initially defined the standard for materiality for securi-
ties litigation in the landmark case, TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.125  The Court held that:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total
mix” of information made available.126
Twelve years later, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,127 the Supreme Court
expressly adopted this definition for securities litigation under the
antifraud provisions of Section 10, particularly Rule 10b-5.128
Determinations of materiality usually require “delicate assess-
ments” based on how a fact would affect the “total mix” of informa-
tion available to investors.129  The sensitivity of these delicate
assessments is usually ratcheted up when private information concern-
ing executives is the information in question.  While voluminous
precedents in securities litigation, specifically those under Rule 10b-
5,130 exist, case law, like the SEC, offers no clear guideposts for materi-
ality of an executive’s private facts.131
governmental (or public) and individual interests.”); Chris Dolmetsch & Peter Bur-
rows, Apple May Not Need to Reveal Details of Steve Jobs Medical Leave, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2011, 12:04 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-
18/apple-may-not-need-to-reveal-details-of-steve-jobs-medical-leave.html (quoting vari-
ous legal scholars who noted that securities law in this area is gray and leaves much to
be desired).
123 17 C.F.R. § 229.401–404 (2011).
124 See, e.g., id. § 240.10b-5.
125 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
126 Id. at 449.
127 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
128 Id. at 231–32.
129 TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 450; see Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 231–32.
130 See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–25 (2002) (noting the growth of
securities litigation under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (observing how Rule 10b-5 is “a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn”); Herzog, supra note 83, at 366–73 (discuss- R
ing the broad and growing application of Rule 10b-5).
131 Courts, however, have offered some interpretative guidance on materiality, in
general, over the years. See, e.g., Chambers v. AMDOCS Ltd., 390 F.3d 542, 548 (8th
Cir. 2004) (“Alleged misrepresentations can be immaterial as a matter of law if they
. . . are so vague and of such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely
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Deciding what information to publicly disclose and when to dis-
close it can be difficult and complicated for firms.132  However, even
more difficult and complicated is deciding what and when to disclose
potentially material, private information of executives.133  Such deci-
sions must be made on a case-by-case basis because no two firms and
no two executives are identical.134  It involves measurable and immea-
surable factors and a great deal of judgment.135  Does a CEO’s divorce
settlement merit disclosure?136  What about health issues concerning a
CFO?137  Is an executive’s asymptomatic genetic mutation worthy of
disclosure?138  How about an executive’s home purchases, furnishings,
upon them . . . .”); In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding statements “that are essentially mere ‘puffery’” as immate-
rial); Recupito v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D. Md. 2000) (“[I]f
the alleged misstatements or omissions ‘are so obviously unimportant to an investor
that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality, the court may rule
them immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Klein v. Gen. Nutrition Cos., 186 F.3d
338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999))).
132 See Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 761 (“Materiality determina-
tions are open-textured; the wording of the relevant antifraud rules is quite broad and
susceptible to multiple interpretations, even with SEC and federal court guidance.”);
Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 639, 644 (1996) (“Matters of materiality . . . are often difficult to work through
confidently . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
133 See Heminway, supra note 33, at 117 (“Omissions to state personal facts raise R
different, thornier issues.” (footnote omitted)).
134 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (recogniz-
ing that different firms may make different determinations on questions of business
without breaching their duty of care); Lin, supra note 33, at 407 (acknowledging that R
material executive disclosure require a case-by-case analysis).
135 See John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 45–49 (1998) (discussing the complex
judgments involved in securities disclosures); Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33,
at 761 (“Materiality analyses also involve consideration of both quantitative and quali-
tative factors.”).
136 See Liz Benston & Jeff German, Wynns’ Breakup Won’t Break Up Company, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/mar/
18/breakup-wont-break-company (“Steve and Elaine Wynn are ending their marriage,
but the business partnership that built Wynn Resorts into a Strip powerhouse is not
breaking up.”); Katherine Yung, Dean Foods Keeps Move in the Open: Company Says Its
CEO Will Sell Stock to Help in Divorce Settlement, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003, at
2D (reporting on the disclosure of Dean Foods Company’s CEO to sell his shares in
the company to facilitate his divorce settlement).
137 See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Trouble with Steve Jobs, FORTUNE, Mar. 17,
2008, at 88 (“[T]here are no specific guidelines governing health issues, and the SEC
has never taken action against a company in this area.”).
138 See Thomas Goetz, Sergey’s Search, WIRED, July 2010, at 108 (discussing disclo-
sure by Google’s co-president of a genetic mutation that increases his chances for
Parkinson’s disease).
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or renovations?139  What about the death of an executive’s spouse or
child?  Are these facts “material” to a reasonable investor?  If so,
should corporations disclose all these facts?
Absent guidance from the law and regulators, legal tensions in
securities law will persist for these difficult questions.
B. Tensions Under Corporate Law
An executive’s fiduciary duties under corporate law to disclose
material, private information can conflict with privacy concerns, thus,
creating tensions and complexities regarding the disclosure of such
information.140  It is generally understood that executives owe both
their boards and their corporations the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty, which encompasses an obligation to consistently act in the best
interests of the corporation.141  Therefore, executives’ nondisclosure
of material, private information to their firms’ directors and share-
holders can result in legitimate concerns about breaches of their fidu-
ciary duties.142
1. Duty of Care
The duty of care under corporate law obligates executives to exer-
cise “that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men
139 See McLean, supra note 108 (reporting on the secret lair an executive built R
underneath his mansion); Crocker H. Liu & David Yermack, Where are the Shareholders’
Mansions? CEOs’ Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance (Work-
ing Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970413 (measuring and ana-
lyzing the effect of home purchases and stock sales by CEOs on the performance of
their firms); Daniel Schorn, Dennis Kozlowski: Prisoner 05A4820, 60 MINUTES (July 23,
2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/22/60minutes/main2596123.
shtml (reporting on the lavish corporate apartment furnishings of the then-chief
executive officer of Tyco International, Dennis Kozlowski).
140 See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor
and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (2003) (“There are many fascinating
angles to an inquiry into whether corporate agents have an affirmative duty to disclose
information to their superiors, a category that includes—at the very top of the corpo-
rate pyramid—the board of directors.”).
141 See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that execu-
tives owe their firms the duties of care and loyalty); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 8.42(a)(2) (3d ed. Supp. 2005) (stating the obligation of executives to exercise due
care); Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Officers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 479 (2007) (acknowledging the fidu-
ciary duties of corporate officers under Delaware law).
142 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 33, at 112 (exploring the breaches of fiduciary R
duties by executives for nondisclosure of personal facts).
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would use in similar circumstances.”143  Tensions arise in this area
concerning executive disclosures because it is often difficult to deter-
mine how an “ordinarily careful and prudent” executive would behave
in similar circumstances.  Compounding the problem is the fact that
no clear regulatory guidance and no consensus industry “best prac-
tices” exist for such disclosures.
The absence of bright-line rules in this area may be frustrating
but also may be necessary, given that each executive and each com-
pany is different.144  Courts historically have recognized the individu-
alized nature of duty of care decisions and, therefore, generally have
protected the judgments of directors and executives under the doc-
trine of the business judgment rule.145  The business judgment rule
can be understood as an abstention doctrine that “establishes a pre-
sumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.”146  As a result,
143 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42(a)(2) (3d ed. Supp. 2005) (stating the obligation
of executives to exercise due care).
144 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (recogniz-
ing that firms may make different determinations on questions of business without
breaching their duty of care); Lin, supra note 33, at 407 (acknowledging that execu- R
tive disclosures require a case-by-case analysis).
145 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the termi-
nology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers
simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful busi-
ness decisions has been doctrinally labelled [sic] the business judgment rule.”); Shlen-
sky, 237 N.E.2d at 779 (“In a purely business corporation . . . the authority of the
directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be regarded as abso-
lute when they act within the law, and the court is without authority to substitute its
judgment for that of the directors.” (quoting Toebelman v. Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co.,
41 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. Del. 1941))); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888)
(“Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity interference, for
the powers of those intrusted with corporate management are largely discretionary.”);
Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (“The direc-
tors’ room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out
purely business questions.”).
146 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004); see also Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778 (“[C]ourts of equity
will not undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation,
although it may be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the business more
successful if other methods were pursued.” (quoting Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel
Co., 32 N.E. 420, 423 (Ill. 1892))); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule,
55 BUS. LAW. 625, 632 (2000) (understanding “the business judgment rule as a policy
of non-review” (emphasis omitted)).
There exists a competing view of the business judgment rule as a standard of
liability. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(holding “[t]he business judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review” (quoting
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003))); William T. Allen et
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many executives may see themselves as the sole and final arbiter of
whether to disclose a material, private fact because of the broad shield
of the business judgment rule.147
Despite the presumption against judicial review, a breach of the
duty of care is nonetheless possible for faulty executive disclosures
because the shield of the business judgment rule is not omnipotent.148
Business decisions that implicate acts of illegality, fraud, or bad faith
do not warrant the protection of the business judgment rule.149  Addi-
tionally, unconsidered inactions arguably are not protected by the
business judgment rule.150  Thus, for example, a CEO and chairwo-
man of a firm who, because of her personal desires for privacy, fails to
disclose to her board and shareholders a serious debilitating cognitive
disease that materially affects her daily judgment is likely to have
breached her duty of care.  Tensions arise in such scenarios because
the private facts under consideration are often deeply personal and
sensitive, and the business import or materiality of such facts is often
subject to legitimate disagreement.151
2. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty “mandates that the best interest of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders take precedence over any interest pos-
al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A
Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 449, 449–50 (2002) (discussing the business judgment rule as a standard of
liability).
147 See, e.g., Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 765–71 (opining that “the
existing disclosure regime places too much discretion in the hands of executive
officers”).
148 See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“Whatever its merit, however, the business judg-
ment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its existence.”).
149 See id. at 886 (“[The business judgment rule] does not apply in cases, e.g., in
which the corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is tainted by a conflict of inter-
est, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or results from an obvious and
prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.” (internal citations omitted));
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778–79 (holding that the business judgment rule does not
protect decisions that implicate illegality, fraud, or bad faith).
150 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (“[T]he business
judgment rule operates only in the context of director action.”); In re Caremark Int’l
Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The second class of cases in
which director liability for inattention is theoretically possible entail circumstances in
which a loss eventuates not from a decision but, from unconsidered inaction.”).
151 See Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 767–71 (discussing the “highly
stressful and emotionally charged” nature of such decisions).
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sessed by [an] . . . officer.”152  The duty of loyalty obligations are
usually considered when executives’ actions implicate bad faith or self-
dealing.153  Tensions arise in this area concerning executive disclo-
sures because the personal privacy interests of executives may run con-
trary to the best interests of their firms.  Further complicating the
matter is that, similar to determinations of materiality and due care,
no clear standard exists in this area.  As the Delaware Supreme Court
explained, “The occasions for the determination of honesty, good
faith, and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast
rule can be formulated.  The standard of loyalty is measured by no
fixed scale.”154
Matters concerning executive disclosures create an especially
complex calculus because the conflicted interests arguably are jointly
and severally personal and professional, exposing the executive and
the firm to charges ranging from insider trading to corporate waste.
Unlike straightforward duty of loyalty cases where executives steal cor-
porate assets for private purposes, executive disclosure cases often
blur the line between the personal and the professional.  For exam-
ple, Martha Stewart, the CEO of her namesake firm, was indicted for
securities fraud because prosecutors believed that actions relating to
her personal sale of shares in ImClone defrauded her own stockhold-
ers.155  And as previously noted, the SEC investigated Steve Jobs and
Apple for failing to timely disclose his personal medical condition.156
152 Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 191 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
153 See, e.g., United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1293 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“[The] duty of loyalty[ ] obligates officers and directors to avoid fraud, bad faith,
usurpation of corporate opportunities, and self-dealing.” (footnote omitted));
Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., 891 A.2d at 169 (considering a duty of loyalty breach relating
to alleged conflicted dealings among directors).
154 Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Heminway, supra note 33, at R
117 (“Delaware law regarding corporate disclosure duties does not contemplate or
endorse a cause of action against a director for an omission to state facts, except in
the context of a request for a shareholder vote or other action.”).
155 See United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Count
Nine of the Indictment charges that defendant Stewart made materially false state-
ments of fact regarding her sale of ImClone securities with the intention of
defrauding and deceiving investors by slowing or stopping the erosion of the value of
the securities issued by her own company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia.”).
156 See Scheer & Guglielmo, supra note 18 (noting the pressure from investors for R
the SEC to investigate Apple’s disclosure of Mr. Jobs’s health problems); Nicolas
Thompson, The SEC Reportedly Investigates Apple’s Candor About Jobs’s Health, WIRED
(Jan. 21, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/01/the-sec-
investi/ (reporting that an investigation was being conducted).
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These tensions regarding obligations of loyalty will persist absent
some legal guidance and a workable framework.
C. Tensions Under Privacy Laws
The crosscutting and, sometimes, contrary objectives of privacy
laws, securities regulation, and corporate law give rise to serious ten-
sions concerning executive disclosures of private facts.
Federal securities regulation and state corporate law give limited
consideration to privacy concerns.  This limited consideration stems,
in part, from a belief that firms that ask the public for funds must
forego some secrecy and institutional privacy.157  The natural exten-
sion of this belief is that executives who manage public firms must
similarly forego some personal privacy.158
While securities regulation and corporate law offer little privacy
protection, a number of major federal and state statutes were
designed specifically to protect the privacy rights of individuals.159
For example, federal legislation exists to protect private matters con-
cerning an individual’s financial information,160 medical records,161
and health status.162
Therefore, an executive with a serious illness like Steve Jobs may
be required to disclose his ailment to his board and shareholders
under securities and corporate law but be protected by privacy laws
157 See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964); see also David S.
Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 135 (2007) (arguing that firms that receive public dollars for public infra-
structure project should disclose trade secrets for transparency and accountability
purposes).
158 See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. at 174 (“An insider of a corporation
that is asking the public for funds must, in return, relinquish various areas of privacy
with respect to his financial affairs which impinge significantly upon the affairs of the
company.”).
159 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506; Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, 2701
(2006); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710; Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act
of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
160 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codi-
fied as 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809) (safeguarding privacy rights in consumer finance).
161 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.) (protecting privacy rights relating to medical information).
162 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)) (protecting health infor-
mation of individuals from employers).
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safeguarding medical information.163  The firm’s mere inquiry as to
such personal matters may run afoul of certain privacy laws.  For
example, the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits
firms from obtaining medical information about their employees
unless it is “shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”164  Additionally, the ADA prohibits the sharing and public
disclosure of any such health information that a firm gains from its
employees.165  Similar legal conflicts and crosscutting obligations exist
with other private matters of executives that may warrant public
disclosure.166
Absent legal guidance, executive disclosure will reside uncomfort-
ably in the uneasy intersection of securities law, corporate law, and
privacy law.
D. Inconsistent Practices
The myriad of crosscutting legal obligations, the absence of clear
legal guidance, and the lack of a pragmatic theoretical framework
have resulted in inconsistent disclosure practices that frustrate boards,
executives, and shareholders.  To date, the SEC has never punished
any firm for failing to disclose private information about an execu-
tive’s health condition regardless of its materiality.167  While the SEC
most recently investigated Apple’s nondisclosures concerning Mr.
Jobs’s health condition, it still has not issued any formal guidance for
firms.168
The resulting effect is that firms and executives act in an arbitrary
manner concerning executive disclosures.  When former Time
Warner CEO, Steve Ross, was battling prostate cancer, he and his firm
intentionally released arguably misleading information virtually until
163 See Glenn, supra note 119, at 537–43 (discussing the conflicts between securi- R
ties law and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.
164 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
165 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)–(C).
166 Depending on the subject matter of the private information various privacy
laws may be implicated with executive disclosures. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, 2701 (2006); Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710; Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721.
167 See Nocera, supra note 92, at C4 (“No company has ever been held to account R
by the SEC for failing to disclose information about its chief executive’s health . . . .”).
168 See Harvey Silverglate, The SEC Should Leave Steve Jobs Alone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2.
2009, at A15 (“And so the feds will investigate whether Apple misled investors by not
disclosing the intimate details of Mr. Jobs’s latest health scare.”).
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his death.169  When Intel’s former CEO, Andy Grove, was diagnosed
with prostate cancer in 1995, he made no formal disclosure to share-
holders and instead decided to publicly disclose this serious health
condition a year later to Fortune magazine.170  Alternatively, in June of
2000, Warren Buffett issued a press release after learning that he
needed routine surgery to remove polyps from his colon.171  Similarly,
in 2004, Charles Bell, the then-CEO of McDonald’s, promptly issued a
press release after being diagnosed with colorectal cancer.172  Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Bell resigned from the firm and passed away.173
For every candid executive like Mr. Buffett and Mr. Bell, there are
many more secretive executives like Mr. Grove and Mr. Jobs.174  The
net result is a corporate landscape where shareholders are poorly
served by the executives and the firms they invest in, both of whom
are legally bound to protect their interests with candor and disclo-
sure.175  Furthermore, in this landscape, board members cannot prop-
erly govern if executives do not timely inform them about potentially
material, private matters.
An additional complicating factor is that board members can be
overly deferential to senior executives, especially a powerful and influ-
ential chief executive officer who played a significant role in their
placement on the board.176  “[I]n the United States, where the board
169 See Barnard, supra note 33, at 309–10. R
170 See Elkind & Burke, supra note 137 (“When Intel CEO Andy Grove was diag- R
nosed with prostate cancer in 1995, he made no formal disclosure—Grove chose to
write about it instead in a 1996 article for Fortune.”); Nocera, supra note 92, at C4 R
(“The world found out about Mr. Grove’s illness only when he wrote about it the
following year.”).
171 See Elkind & Burke, supra note 137 (“Warren Buffet . . . issued a press release R
in June 2000 days after he learned he would need surgery to remove benign polyps
along with part of his colon, even though the procedure was considered routine.”).
172 See Nocera, supra note 92, at C4 (“[W]hen Charles H. Bell received a diagnosis R
of colorectal cancer shortly after he became the chief executive of McDonald’s in
2004, the company quickly released the news.”); Pressler, supra note 105 (“Within R
hours of [McDonald’s CEO’s] death, McDonald’s elevated his right-hand man, presi-
dent and chief operating officer Charles H. Bell, to the position of chief executive.”).
173 See Nocera, supra note 92, at C4 (“Mr. Bell resigned from the company that R
November, and died two months later.”); Pressler, supra note 105 (reporting Charles R
Bell as McDonald’s CEO in April of 2004).
174 See, e.g., Thomas C. Hayes, Brinker Names New Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at
D1 (reporting on the delayed publication by a firm of its CEO’s serious brain injury).
175 See, e.g., Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 71 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff’d, 266 A.2d 878 (Del.
1970) (“[D]irectors owe a duty to honestly disclose all material facts when they under-
take to give out statements about the business to stockholders.”).
176 See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors
and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72–73 (1990)
(“[M]anagers dominate their boards by using their de facto power to select and com-
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chairmen of 70 percent of public companies serve concurrently as
CEO of the company, challenging senior management may be viewed
as insubordinate.”177  This internal dynamic can make it difficult for
boards to motivate senior executives to make private disclosures, even
if such disclosure is in the best interests of the firm and its
shareholders.
While much of the literature on the issue of executive disclosures
focuses on “celebrity” executives of large public firms—the Steve
Jobses, the Martha Stewarts, and the Warren Buffetts of the business
world178—the issue actually may be more salient to the “anonymous”
executives—the uncelebrated executives of smaller firms.  Despite the
attention lavished on “celebrity” executives, the “anonymous” execu-
tives actually may prove to be more important and material to their
firms.  Notwithstanding all the emphasis on the likes of Steve Jobs,
Martha Stewart, and Warren Buffett, their firms will likely survive and
thrive in their absence because large enterprises like theirs are less
reliant on one individual.179  The same cannot be said for the “anony-
mous” chief executive who is also the founder of a small company with
a few employees.  Those executives are arguably much more material
to their firm’s ultimate success or failure given the scale and resources
of their small firm.  Therefore, these problems of inconsistent execu-
tive disclosure practices are not only an issue for large firms, but for
all firms, regardless of size.
Part II offered an overview of the map-less, tense geography of
executive disclosures.  Part III will survey the smoother landscape of
pensate directors and by exploiting personal ties with them.”); Steven A. Ramirez, The
End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24
YALE J. ON REG. 313, 332 (2007) (“CEOs of public companies have the unique privi-
lege of picking their own nominal supervisors—the board of directors.”).
177 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 62 (2008).
178 See, e.g., Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1551–57 (tracing the rise of celeb- R
rity executives in America); Lin, supra note 33, at 393 (chronicling the ascent of exec- R
utives in the context of prominent executives like “Howard Schultz, Martha Stewart,
Warren Buffett, and Bill Gates” (footnotes omitted)).
179 See Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1600, 1602–04 (arguing that “celebrity R
CEOs” do not “single-handedly affect corporate performance”); Lieberson &
O’Connor, supra note 95, at 128–29 (concluding that CEOs had limited influence on R
a company’s performance based on a study of large firms). But see, e.g., Miguel Helft
& Claire Cain Miller, Despite Anxiety over Leave at Apple, a Deep Bench of Leadership at
Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2011, at B1 (discussing the unique significance of Steve Jobs
to Apple despite the firm’s deep bench of senior executives); Bethany McLean, Mr.
Warren’s Confession, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2011, at 108–15 (discussing the irreplaceable
role of Warren Buffett to his company).
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trade secrets law as a foundation for building a better framework for
executive disclosures.
III. INTRODUCTION TO TRADE SECRETS
American law has long recognized the concept of trade secrets.180
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),181 which most states have
adopted, defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.182
Plainly stated, a trade secret is any confidential information that
confers a competitive advantage and value to its holder by virtue of its
secrecy.  Most statutes and courts require the keepers of the secret
information to make reasonable efforts to maintain the information’s
secrecy.183  This is because once a trade secret is revealed to the public
or an unprivileged third party, it loses its protected status and others
can exploit it for their own purposes.184  This loss of protection even
180 See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Mass. 1868) (“If he invents or dis-
covers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a
patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or
against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it . . . .”); Vickery v. Welch, 36
Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525 (Mass. 1837) (“The defendant was to transfer to the plain-
tiff, for his exclusive use, the secret manner which the defendant had of making
chocolate.”).
181 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
182 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
183 See, e.g., id.; see also Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th
Cir. 1987) (“Surgidev was required to take efforts ‘reasonable under the circum-
stances’ to maintain the secrecy of its customer information.”); FMC Corp. v. Taiwan
Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 62–64 (2d Cir. 1984).
184 See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972) (“Once the
secret is published to the ‘whole world,’ . . . it loses its protected status and becomes
available to others for use and copying without fear of legal reprisal from the original
possessor.” (quoting Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954
(1966))); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 46 (2007) (“By virtue of the fact that
it has been posted, it becomes public and, consequently, loses its trade secret
protection.”).
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applies to instances where trade secrets submitted to the government
are subsequently disclosed by the agency.185
The UTSA’s definition and modern legal understanding of trade
secrets is expansive and nimble.  Trade secrets encompass informa-
tion as varied as contracts,186 marketing strategies,187 pricing data,188
production methods,189 recipes, and salaries.190  Furthermore, “a
trade secret does not need to be in use to be protected.”191  In sum, as
one legal scholar noted, “So long as the information is capable of
adding economic value to the plaintiff, it can be protected by trade
secret law.”192
Trade secret law is incredibly appealing to firms because, in addi-
tion to its legal dexterity, it is easier to utilize relative to other methods
of intellectual property protection.193  Whereas copyright law and pat-
185 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield
Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 800 (2011) (“If a company submit-
ted trade-secret information to the government and that information was disclosed by
the government to the public, it is the trade-secret owner who would ultimately bear
the cost of the government’s misguided action.”).
186 See, e.g., ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 728–30 (Ark. 2000)
(conferring trade secret protections to contracts).
187 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1265–70 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that marketing strategies can be trade secrets).
188 See, e.g., McFarland v. Brier, No. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *5 (R.I. Super.
Ct. May 13, 1998), vacated on other grounds, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001) (stating that
customer data and pricing information can be protected under trade secrets
doctrine).
189 See, e.g., Norbrook Labs. Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mgf. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 463,
482–83 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); ConAgra, Inc., 30 S.W.3d at 728–30 (conferring trade secret
protections to production methods).
190 See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, Business Plans and Strategies as Legally Protected Trade
Secrets: Florida and National Perspectives, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11–15 (2001)
(enumerating the various types of business information that can be considered as
trade secrets).
191 See Rowe, supra note 185, 799–800; see also Michael P. Simpson, The Future of R
Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—an Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 1121, 1151 (2005) (discussing how one firm withheld product research under
trade secrets doctrine in the tobacco industry).
192 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 317 (2008).
193 See, e.g., David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 61, 62–66 (1991) (articulating the economic efficiency of trade secrets protec-
tion); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2007) (explaining the attractiveness of trade secrets to busi-
nesses as a form of intellectual property protection); Brooks W. Taylor, You Can’t Say
That!: Enjoining Publication of Trade Secrets Despite the First Amendment, 9 COMPUTER L.
REV. & TECH J. 393, 394–95 (2005) (discussing the corporate affinity for trade secret
protection).
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ent law limit their protection to only certain types of information,194
and such protection generally requires the government’s imprimatur,
trade secrets law has a broader protective shield and requires no gov-
ernment approval.195  For example, copyright law only protects “origi-
nal works of authorship” such as music lyrics, books, and movie
scripts, but it does not extend to information like business methods
and processes.196  Individuals seeking copyright protection frequently
make filings and registrations with the U.S. Copyright Office.197  Simi-
larly, patent law only protects novel, non-obvious inventions of util-
ity.198  This protection generally does not extend to intangible
innovations and abstract ideas.199  Moreover, such protection is only
obtained after an applicant has successfully endured the long and
194 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 377–80 (2002) (discussing
limitation on patentable information).
195 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain
the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1432 (2009) (“Trade secret protection is attractive
relative to other kinds of intellectual property protection in part because of the broad
scope of information that is protectable and [because a] . . . business can . . . protect
trade secrets without complying with a government registration system.”).
196 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”); United States Copyright Office: A
Brief Introduction And History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/circs/
circ1a.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter United States Copyright Office]
(“Copyright protection does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, slogan, prin-
ciple, or discovery.”).
197 United States Copyright Office, supra note 196 (“The Copyright Office examines R
all applications and deposits presented for the registration of original and renewal
copyright claims to determine their acceptability for registration under the provisions
of the copyright law and Copyright Office regulations.”).
198 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (denying the patentability of a subject matter if
“the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per-
tains”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (“Patentability is to depend,
in addition to novelty and utility, upon the ‘non-obvious’ nature of the ‘subject matter
sought to be patented’ to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”).
199 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–103; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 403
(2007) (ruling that a claim was not protected because it was obvious); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that there
is no “business method” exception to patentability); Beckerman-Rodau, supra note
194, at 378; Lemley, supra note 192, at 313 (“[Trade secret law] extends to protection R
of types of business and process information that likely would not be patentable.”).
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cumbersome200 patent process dictated by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office.201
That said, for all their strengths, trade secrets are not without
weaknesses.  The Achilles heel of a trade secret is that once it is pub-
licly revealed or made known to an unprivileged party, it loses its pro-
tected status.202  Moreover, third parties can legitimately reveal trade
secrets via reverse engineering or independent research, thereby
destroying a trade secret’s protected status.203  Patents and copyrights,
for all their other disadvantages, are not susceptible to the swords of
reverse engineering and public disclosure.  Nonetheless, given the
restrictions and costs of other methods of legal protections, trade
secret doctrine remains an incredibly attractive form of protection for
a firm’s economically valuable information.
In the final analysis, trade secrets play an important role not only
in protecting economically valuable information, but also in fostering
innovation and growth for the economy-at-large.204  The shield of
200 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Explo-
ration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000) (noting that patent
applications can take years to process).
201 See Lemley, supra note 192, at 313 (opining that trade secret protection is eas- R
ier and cheaper to obtain relative to patent protection because it does not require
government approval); Process for Obtaining a Utility Patent, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 18, 2011)
(explaining the patent process graphically).
202 See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972) (“Once the
secret is published to the ‘whole world,’ . . . it loses its protected status and becomes
available to others for use and copying without fear of legal reprisal from the original
possessor.” (quoting Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954
(D.C. Cir. 1966))); Rowe, supra note 184, at 46 (“By virtue of the fact that it has been R
posted, it becomes public and, consequently, loses its trade secret protection.”).
203 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 194 (Ct.
App. 2004) (affirming reverse engineering as a legitimate means to obtain a trade
secret).
204 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991) (noting the economic significance of trade secrets protection); U.S.-CHINA
ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 111TH CONG., 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 259 (Comm.
Print 2010) (reporting China’s issuance of new trade secrets regulations to protect
and enhance its economic interests); JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
ROLE OF TRADE SECRETS IN INNOVATION POLICY, at summary (2010) (“As the United
States continues its shift to a knowledge- and service-based economy, the strength and
competitiveness of domestic firms increasingly depends upon their know-how and
intangible assets.  Trade secrets are the form of intellectual property that protects this
sort of confidential information.”). But see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret
Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (1998) (questioning the purpose of trade secrets
law in light of other more established legal concentrations working towards similar
ends).
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trade secret law protects small start-ups as well as large enterprises,
from the garage operation in Silicon Valley to the global conglomer-
ate on Wall Street.205  By some estimates, trade secrets account for a
significant portion of business assets.206  Some of the most valuable
and popular products in the global economy exist as such primarily
because of trade secrets.  The formula for Coca-Cola,207 the recipe for
KFC’s fried chicken,208 the constitution of WD-40 lubricant,209 and
the ingredients of a Twinkie210 are prominent examples of trade
secrets.  For every prominent example, there are probably thousands
of examples less prominent (for obvious reasons) but no less valuable
or important.
Parts II and III surveyed the uncharted landscape of executive
disclosures and the mapped terrain of trade secrets, respectively.  Part
IV will utilize the charted terrain of trade secrets as the legal cartogra-
phy for the map-less landscape of executive disclosures by conceiving
the concept of Executive Trade Secrets as a pragmatic theoretical
framework for executive disclosures.
IV. THE EXECUTIVE TRADE SECRETS FRAMEWORK
A. An Introduction to Executive Trade Secrets
The theory of Executive Trade Secrets re-conceptualizes and
expands traditional understandings of trade secrets to capture com-
petitively valuable, private information of executives.  Executive Trade
Secrets creates a pragmatic, theoretical framework for safeguarding
competitively valuable, private information of executives in the pres-
205 See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY 30–32 (2003) (discussing the use
of established firms’ trade secrets by startup high-tech firms).
206 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 33–37 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the growing importance of trade
secrets to companies, particularly to small businesses driving innovation); Rowe, supra
note 193, at 1049 (“Trade secrets encompass approximately eighty percent of the R
assets of some companies.”).
207 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D.
Del. 1985) (“The complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade secrets
in the world.”); MARK PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY & COCA-COLA 456–57 (2000)
(reporting on the lengths that Coca-Cola goes to protect the secrecy of its formula).
208 See History: The Secret Recipe, KFC, http://www.kfc.com/about/secret.asp (last
visited Nov. 18, 2011) (describing the history of the “secret recipe”).
209 See Fascinating Facts You Never Learned in School, WD-40, http://www.wd40.com/
about-us/history/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (“[T]he original secret formula for WD-
40 . . . is still in use today.”).
210 See STEVE ETTLINGER, TWINKIE DECONSTRUCTED i–v (2007).
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ence of SEC mandates for disclosure.211  Additionally, it provides
stronger protection for the privacy interests of executives212 and the
economic interests of investors.
Under this theory, Executive Trade Secrets are defined as:
Private information concerning executives that: “(i) derives inde-
pendent economic value, actual or potential,” for the firm from not
“being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts” by the
firm “that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.”213
This re-imagining of private matters of executives as trade secrets
is neither a radical nor unfaithful departure from traditional under-
standings of trade secrets.214  This conception is consistent with the
organizational behavior of many firms towards such private matters.
Many firms already treat certain private matters of their executives as
if they were traditional trade secrets, as evidenced by their actions
relating to the two elements of Executive Trade Secrets.
As to the first element, many firms already gain independent eco-
nomic value from their exclusive knowledge of material, private facts
pertaining to its executives.  Like traditional trade secrets, exclusive
knowledge of material, private executive information can often pro-
vide firms with a competitive advantage.  This competitive advantage
manifests in many forms such as better allocation of institutional
resources or succession planning, which is one of the most important
211 See 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(c)(1) (2011) (affording “confidential treatment under
the Freedom of Information Act to such information for reasons of personal privacy
or business confidentiality” in SEC filings); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006)
(protecting information from disclosure to governmental investigators when that
information “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy”).
212 See Rowe, supra note 195, at 1435 (“In general, trade secret laws appear to R
provide greater protection to corporations against surveillance by competitors than
individuals receive under privacy torts for incursions by other individuals.”).
213 The basis of this definition is rooted in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s defini-
tion of a trade secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
538 (2005).
214 Other scholars previously have written on lessons that privacy law can learn
from trade secrets law. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2000) (proposing that “certain default licensing rules of
trade secrecy law may be adapted to protect personal information in cyberspace”);
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret
Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 692 (2006) (arguing that “information privacy law
can better protect personal information if it adopts three features of trade secret
law”).
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decisions of a corporation.215  For example, Apple’s exclusive,
advance knowledge about Steve Jobs’s health condition in 2009 gave
the company incredible insights and competitive advantages about
how best to plan for operations management in his temporary
absence and eventual succession in the event of his permanent
absence.216  Foreknowledge of that secret information also likely bet-
ter positioned Apple to retain key executives on its management team
and prevent them from being poached by competitors, which is a real
concern in competitive industries where specialized human and intel-
lectual capital is scarce.217  When Mr. Jobs resigned as CEO in August
of 2011, because of such advance planning, Apple was able to transi-
tion seamlessly to Tim Cook, its then chief operating officer, as its new
chief executive at the strong recommendation of Mr. Jobs.218
As to the second element, many firms already undertake signifi-
cant efforts to protect the secrecy of such information.  Similar to the
efforts that firms make to protect traditional trade secrets, firms
undertake significant efforts to protect the private information about
their executives that bestows a corporate, economic advantage.  These
efforts manifest themselves in forms such as private security for senior
executives,219 enhanced digital security for executive and corporate
215 WILLIAM J. ROTHWELL, EFFECTIVE SUCCESSION PLANNING 31–41, 131–36 (2010)
(explicating the important role of chief executives and boards in advance corporate
succession planning); A.G. Lafley, The Art and Science of Finding the Right CEO, HARV.
BUS. REV., Oct. 2011, at 67–68 (“[C]hoosing the next CEO is the single most impor-
tant decision a board of directors will make.”).
216 See WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 557–59 (2011) (describing the fluent transi-
tion from Steve Jobs to Tim Cook as executed by Apple’s board of directors); Helft &
Miller, supra note 179, at B4 (discussing Tim Cook as a reassuring temporary steward R
in Steve Jobs’s absence); Kane, supra note 16 (“The disclosure immediately sparked R
new concerns about how much information Apple was keeping to itself on Mr. Jobs’s
health.”).
217 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Google Grows, So Some Talent Takes Its Leave, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (reporting on Google’s efforts to retain key employees in
the “war for talent”); Jonathan Weber, Internet Giants Foster, and Threaten, Innovation
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2010, at A33A (alluding to the fierce competition for
talent in the high-technology industry).
218 Verne G. Kopytoff & David Streitfeld, Big Shoes, but Maybe Not Unfillable, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at B1 (reporting on Apple’s succession plan after Mr. Jobs resig-
nation); Scott Martin, Apple CEO Tim Cook as Pitchman No.1, USA TODAY, Aug. 26,
2011, at 3B (“Apple experts say that Cook takes over an all-star management team that
Jobs put in place and point to a deep talent pool.”).  While the verdict on Tim Cook’s
reign as Apple’s CEO remains to be rendered, the initial reviews suggest that Steve
Jobs’ reign as Apple’s CEO ended in a fairly smooth manner.
219 See Miguel Helft, Google’s Chief gets $1 in Pay; His Security Costs $532,755, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/tech-
nology/05google.html (“Schmidt’s [Google’s chief executive officer] personal secur-
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communications in the face of rising cyber threats,220 and persistent
defenses of the privacy rights of executives.  Apple, for instance,
refused to disclose specifics of Mr. Jobs’s health condition despite
intense public pressure and efforts to seek out that information.221
Firms also have petitioned for the sealing of their executives’ divorce
records as a way to protect trade secrets and other sensitive business
information.222
In sum, the economic benefits that Apple secured from its exclu-
sive knowledge of Mr. Jobs’ health condition and the efforts that it
made to maintain its exclusivity of that knowledge is arguably not fun-
damentally so different from the economic benefits that Apple
secured from its exclusive knowledge of the underlying trade secrets
of the iPhone 4 and the efforts that it made to maintain its exclusivity
of that knowledge.  Given such symmetry, where appropriate, the law
should view both types of information as trade secrets and worthy of
ity cost shareholders $532,755.”); Matt Andrejczak, CEO Security-Tabs Fall at Google,
FedEx and Disney, MARKET WATCH (Apr. 12, 2010, 2:34 PM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/ceo-security-tabs-fall-at-google-fedex-and-disney-2010-04-12 (reporting on
how much companies such as Kodak, Citigroup, and John Deere spend on private
security).
220 Electronic security and cybersecurity efforts for executives have been ratcheted
up in modern times where secrets can be readily revealed to the world with a few
clicks originating from anywhere in the world. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 195, at R
1046–48 (discussing the problems that the Internet poses for protecting trade
secrets); David Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2011, at A11 (“Cyber security is now a major international concern, with hack-
ers gaining access sensitive corporate and military secrets, including intellectual prop-
erty.”); Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, at 220
(“Because virtual attacks can be routed through computer servers anywhere in the
world, it is almost impossible to attribute any hack with total certainty.”); Michael
Riley & Ashlee Vance, The Code War, BUSINESSWEEK, July 25, 2011, at 52 (reporting on
the increased vulnerabilities of corporations to cyberattacks); Jeff Zeleny, For a High-
Tech President, a Hard-Fought E-Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A18 (discussing
enhanced security measures for President Barack Obama’s Blackberry).
221 See ISAACSON, supra note 216, at 481–82 (describing how Apple’s board pro-
tected the privacy of Mr. Jobs);  Helft, supra note 19, at A1 (noting the lack of details R
and comments from Apple relating to Mr. Jobs’s medical leave in January 2011); Con-
nie Guglielmo, Apple’s Steve Jobs Takes Medical Leave; Shares Plunge (Update 3), BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 14, 2009, 6:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aLa7Vr5gU21A (“Apple spokesman Steve Dowling declined to comment
[on Jobs’s health] and said Cook and Apple’s board members aren’t available for
interviews.”).
222 See Tresa Baldas, Divorces Sealed as Business Priority, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at
1 (“Divorce lawyers say corporations . . . are increasingly asking judges to seal the
divorce records of top executives to protect trade secrets or crucial financial informa-
tion from leaking out.”).
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legal protection, not only as a matter of factual consistency, but also as
a matter of fidelity to the laws implicated by executive disclosures.
B. Fidelity to Laws Concerning Executive Disclosures
The re-conceptualization of trade secrets to capture private facts
of executives is faithful to, and consistent with, the first principles of
the laws concerning executive disclosures, thereby assuaging the cur-
rent tensions surrounding the executive disclosures that arise, par-
tially, from the crosscutting legal considerations of those laws.
Executive Trade Secrets, thus, offers executives, investors, and regula-
tors a pragmatic framework for resolving some of those issues given its
fidelity to the first principles of the laws of trade secrets, privacy, secur-
ities, and corporations.223
First, as to trade secrets law, Executive Trade Secrets is consistent
with trade secrets law’s first principle to allow businesses to capitalize
on its economically significant, secret knowledge created or secured
through their efforts.224  Executive Trade Secrets encourages busi-
nesses to protect and optimally capitalize on arguably their most valu-
able and irreplaceable assets in the eyes of the market—their
executives.225
Second, as to privacy law, the concept of Executive Trade Secrets
is consistent with privacy law’s first principle to protect the informa-
tional privacy of individuals.  Broadly, it also can be argued that pri-
vacy law and trade secrets law share several fundamental interests:
“First, an interest in protecting the interest of the claimant to restrict
access to and unauthorized uses of secret/private information; sec-
ond, an interest in giving firms/individuals control over commercial
223 While Executive Trade Secrets implicates other legal fields such as contract
law, property law, and labor law, this Article focuses on the laws relating to trade
secrets, privacy, securities, and corporations because they are most closely intertwined
with the concept of Executive Trade Secrets.
224 Trade Secrets, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-
guide/trade-secrets (last updated May 28, 2008) (“The main goal of trade secrets law
is to provide a way for businesses to capitalize on their unique practices or knowledge
created through their time and effort.”).
225 See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, ImClone Case Drags Martha Stewart Shares Down, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2002, at C6 (reporting that Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc.
“depends heavily on Ms. Stewart and the name she has made for herself”); Letter
from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (February 2008), available at http://www.berkshire
hathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf (“Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any
enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers.  Their abilities
have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical
CEOs had been running their businesses.”).
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exploitations of secret/private information; and third, an interest in
setting and enforcing minimum standards of commercial morality.”226
Executive Trade Secrets offers a theoretical framework rooted in these
shared interests that enhances the protection of sensitive personal
information of commercial importance from the prying eyes of com-
petitors and the public.  Specifically, the framework enhances privacy
protection by supplementing an executive’s individual efforts with a
firm’s institutional efforts to protect personal information of competi-
tive importance227 and to safeguard a firm’s commercial privacy.228
The Supreme Court has opined on the importance of such protec-
tion: “A most fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened
when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable; the state
interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is
unchallengeable.”229
Third, as to securities law, the concept of Executive Trade Secrets
is faithful to securities law’s first principle of protecting the investors
through meaningful disclosures without forcing a company to disclose
valuable secrets.230  Counterintuitively, “trade secret law actually
encourages disclosure, not secrecy.  Without legal protection, compa-
nies in certain industries would invest too much in keeping secrets.”231
Therefore, the secrecy permitted by Executive Trade Secrets actually
improves disclosure practices by creating a framework that encourages
226 Samuelson, supra note 214, at 1151–52. R
227 See Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property—Part V: Democratic Process and Nonpublic
Politics, ENGLISHDISCOURSE.ORG (Spring 2002), http://www.englishdiscourse.org/les-
sig.html (arguing that a property-based rhetoric “would strengthen the rhetorical
force behind privacy”).
228 See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016–17 (5th
Cir. 1970) (asserting the law’s protection of commercial privacy); Charles R.
McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway: International Intellectual Property
Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207, 223 (1996) (“Histori-
cally, trade secret law . . . protects industrial and commercial privacy.”); see also AT&T
Inc., v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a corporation may have
“personal privacy” interests); SCHEPPELE, supra note 1, at 231–47 (discussing trade R
secrets in the context of corporate privacy).
229 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (footnote omitted).
230 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (artic-
ulating the purpose of federal securities regulation is to “substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(c)(1) (2011)
(protecting from disclosure confidential corporate matters in filings to the SEC). But
see Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm
(reporting on a hedge fund’s refusal to comply with certain disclosure requirement
for fear of revealing trade secrets).
231 Lemley, supra note 192, at 313. R
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more meaningful disclosure from executives and sets clearer expecta-
tions about executive disclosures for the investors.
The current map-less terrain of executive disclosures offers no
clear paths for firms and leaves investors with no clear expectations.
This lack of clarity has resulted in inconsistent practices where certain
firms and executives—similarly situated—reveal too much, while
others reveal too little or nothing at all, at varying time horizons.
With Executive Trade Secrets, executives would be more inclined
to disclose certain potentially material, private matters to their boards
because a clear and sensible legal avenue for firms to maintain their
secrets would exist.232  This is possible because trade secrets law does
not require absolute secrecy nor does it require a complete bar
against disclosure.  Instead, trade secrets law’s nimbleness permits rel-
ative secrecy and privileged disclosures.233
Additionally, with Executive Trade Secrets, investors would be
better conditioned to expect that certain private information will not
be disclosed for legitimate business concerns and that other types of
private information would be readily disclosed.  This shift of expecta-
tion norms would allow investors to be more inclined to trust the dis-
closure and management of firms, instead of speculating about
possible omissions, since most firms would likely be operating under
similar norms.
Fourth, as to corporate law, Executive Trade Secrets is consistent
with corporate law’s first principle to maximize shareholder wealth
through better corporate governance.234  Executive Trade Secrets
232 See id. at 334–37 (arguing that trade secrets protection encourages disclosure
of confidential information that firms may not be willing to disclose in the absence of
such protection).
233 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir.
1986) (discussing what constitutes a “limited disclosure”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (1995) (“If the owner of a trade secret discloses
information for a limited purpose that is known to the recipient at the time of the
disclosure, the recipient is ordinarily bound by the limitation unless the recipient has
indicated an unwillingness to accept the disclosure on such terms.”); JAMES POOLEY,
TRADE SECRETS § 4.04[2][a] (2006) (“[T]he concept of ‘relative secrecy’ is actually
quite simple and compelling: a secret remains protectable even when it is shared, so
long as it hasn’t escaped into the mainstream of public knowledge.”).
234 See Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 07-13235-BC, 2007 WL 2782060, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Sept 24, 2007) (“A first principle of the law addressing corporate govern-
ance is that corporations exist to maximize value for their owners, the sharehold-
ers.”); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 381–82 (2002) (“[T]he event study
literature serves as a helpful arbiter of corporate law debates because all sides hold
the same normative conception of corporate law, shareholder wealth
maximization.”).
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improves corporate governance because it encourages executives to
make private disclosures to their boards without constant fear of auto-
matic, subsequent publication.  It also allows boards to process and
deliberate on such private information without the vagaries of securi-
ties and corporate law.  Currently, many executives are likely reluctant
to disclose material, private information to their boards for fear of
mandated disclosure, thereby, leaving firms and shareholders vulnera-
ble to sudden institutional shocks.235  It is generally understood that
“[t]rade secret law reduces investments in secrecy and encourages the
dissemination of the secret to more people who can make productive
use of it.”236  Executive Trade Secrets creates a path for privileged dis-
closures to firms that allows boards to be better informed and to bet-
ter plan and act in the long term interests of shareholders.
In sum, Executive Trade Secrets alleviates some of the crosscut-
ting legal tensions in executive disclosures because it is faithful to the
first principles of the laws of trade secrets, privacy, securities, and
corporations.
C. Executive Disclosures with Executive Trade Secrets
Executive Trade Secrets will improve executive disclosures
because it creates a pragmatic framework for firms and regulators to
consider and safeguard material, private information of executives.
This will likely encourage more timely disclosures by executives of
such information to their boards, and their shareholders, where
appropriate.237  Because of this effect, Executive Trade Secrets will aid
firms in preventing and managing crises that arise from the disclosure
of disruptive private facts relating to its executives.
Under the current legal framework, executive disclosures are
haphazard and arbitrary.  For a host of mixed motives, many of which
concern privacy, some executives chose to disclose potentially mate-
rial, private information to their boards and the public;238 others
235 See, e.g., Scheer & Guglielmo, supra note 18 (articulating that the SEC was R
investigating Mr. Jobs and Apple because when he became ill, he belatedly disclosed it
to the company’s board).
236 Lemley, supra note 192, at 353. R
237 Admittedly, even with Executive Trade Secrets, disclosure of sensitive private
facts such as a serious health condition will remain difficult for many executives.
238 It should be noted that not all executives are secretive about sensitive private
matters.  For example, Sergey Brin, the co-founder and president of Google, volunta-
rily revealed to the world that he had “a genetic mutation that has been associated
with higher rates of Parkinson’s.”  Goetz, supra note 138, at 108. R
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choose to disclose only to their boards;239 and some simply chose to
remain silent to all parties.  While the motivations of executives to
reveal or conceal private facts remain varied and unclear, what is sin-
gularly clear is that this arbitrary practice leaves firms and sharehold-
ers dangerously susceptible to revelations that shock market value and
institutional stability.240
Under the Executive Trade Secrets framework, executive disclo-
sures take on greater clarity because the institutional and personal
concerns of the firm and the executive are taken into better consider-
ation.  To illustrate how this would operate in practice, consider the
following hypothetical scenarios involving Anne Arcanum, the
founder, chairwoman, and CEO of Acme Inc. who was recently diag-
nosed with Stage III liver cancer—first, under the current framework;
then, under the Executive Trade Secrets framework.
Under the current framework, Ms. Arcanum, a very private indi-
vidual, may be reluctant to share her diagnosis with the board for fear
of immediate public disclosure and because she feels it is irrelevant to
her job performance.  This would be an understandable sentiment
given the lack of clear guidance on executive disclosures.  As months
pass, Ms. Arcanum’s condition deteriorates and affects her job per-
formance.241  But no disclosure is made to her board or shareholders.
Eventually, Ms. Arcanum and Acme publicly disclose her condition
after her cancer has advanced to Stage IV, her prognosis for survival is
low, and she is forced to resign from her company.  As a result of the
abrupt disclosure, Acme’s stock falls precipitously and the board
scrambles to find a suitable successor.242
Under the Executive Trade Secrets framework, Ms. Arcanum
would be more inclined to timely disclose her diagnosis to the board
because she knows that reflexive, immediate disclosure is unlikely and
because she knows that her board may make reasonable efforts to pro-
239 Steve Jobs, for instance, only disclosed the gravity of health condition to
Apple’s board in 2008. See ISAACSON, supra note 216, at 479–82.
240 See SCHEPPELE, supra note 1, at 21–22, 75–76 (discussing the general dangers R
posed by secrets of varying depths); Barnard, supra note 33, at 309, 321 (making simi- R
lar argument in advocacy of having directors examine the personal expenditures of
top-level executives as a safeguard against “real corporate harm”).
241 See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 33, at 325 (“Preoccupation with serious illness and R
pain, or the results of medication, may cloud an executive’s judgment, impair her
concentration, distract her from previously established priorities, limit her ability to
interact with subordinates, inhibit travel, interrupt ongoing negotiations, or, in cross-
cultural settings, interrupt the establishment of business relationships.”).
242 See, e.g., W. Bruce Johnson et al., An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden
Executive Deaths, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 152 (1985) (studying shocks to stock price
precipitating from sudden executive death).
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tect this competitively advantageous information under trade secrets
law without the fear of securities law violations.  Assuming that Ms.
Arcanum timely discloses her diagnosis to her board and the board
decides that this secret information is of significant economic value to
Acme, the firm would then likely take reasonable efforts to ensure the
secrecy of this information.243  Practically, this timely disclosure would
allow Acme to better support Ms. Arcanum, given her health condi-
tion; strategically, this timely disclosure would allow the firm to plan
for her deterioration or departure, thereby better positioning the firm
to succeed in the absence of its founder.  The firm would eventually
make public disclosures concerning Ms. Arcanum and those disclo-
sures would, nonetheless, likely shock the market, but that shock may
be preemptively mitigated by the remedial steps that the firm had
taken to ensure its stability.244  Because securities law makes
allowances for firms regarding the nondisclosure of trade secrets and
other sensitive information, firms are better positioned to act in the
shareholders’ long-term interests.245
Ultimately, executive disclosures existing within an Executive
Trade Secrets framework will lead to more internal transparency in
boardrooms between executives and directors because the framework
creates a safeguarded path for internal disclosures and discussions
with diminished fear of publication and litigation.  Simultaneously, it
could also lead to better and more executive disclosures to the public
as firms would be inclined to protect only private information of sig-
nificant economic value, and not all private information.246  The net
243 It may also be plausible that the firm could determine that such private infor-
mation is of insignificant economic value relative to other factors arising from its
secrecy, and decide to publicly disclose Ms. Arcanum’s condition.
244 See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 242, at 151–52, 172–74 (discussing sharp
changes in share price associated with unexpected executive death in correlation with
the executive’s perceived importance to the company); Matt Krantz, Investors Steadfast,
for Now, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2011, at 1B (reporting on Apple’s small losses given its
smooth CEO transition).
245 See, e.g., Instructions to Item 402(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2011) (“Registrants
are not required to disclose . . . confidential trade secrets or confidential commercial
or financial information, the disclosure of which would result in competitive harm for
the registrant.”); id. § 230.406 (allowing for confidential treatment of certain informa-
tion filed with the commission); id. § 240.24b-2 (allowing for nondisclosure of certain
information filed with the SEC); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities
Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 865–66 (1995) (“The need for confidentiality was, in
fact, a credible argument in the formative years of the securities laws. . . . A section
was added to the Exchange Act specifically addressing trade secrets.”).
246 See Lemley, supra note 192, at 313 (discussing how in the absence of trade R
secrets protection, firms would be less forthright and “invest too much in keeping
secrets”).
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result will be better corporate governance for shareholders and better
privacy protections for executives.
D. A Political Analogy: Executive Privilege
The re-conception of trade secrets law to confer protected status
to executive information, as articulated, may appear unprecedented,
but it is not sui generis in American law.  The concept of executive
privilege in constitutional law serves as an inelegant, but instructive
political analogue to understanding Executive Trade Secrets.
Executive privilege refers to the legal doctrine that permits the
president and members of the executive branch to withhold informa-
tion from the legislative and judicial branches.247  “It is, thus also a
power that enables presidents to keep information secret from the
media and the public.”248  Presidential administrations often have
defended their use of executive privilege based on the demands of
secrecy in national security matters and the necessity for confidential,
candid deliberations.249
In terms of national security and secrecy, the interests of the pub-
lic’s right to know must be balanced against protecting the nation-
state.250  Historically, courts have shown great deference to the execu-
tive branch’s desires for secrecy and nondisclosure of information
relating to national security.251  Courts have viewed such secrecy as
247 See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in the Clinton Scandal, in THE CLINTON
SCANDAL 81, 81 (Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000) (“[E]xecutive privilege is
an implied power that enables presidents and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”).
248 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in an Era of Polarized Politics, in EXECUTING THE
CONSTITUTION 91, 91 (Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006).
249 See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 6 (2002) (noting that President
George W. Bush had to defend his use of executive privilege in the first two years of
his term); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (1974)
(“The Executive Branch, on the other hand, has an undeniably legitimate interest, at
least under some circumstances, in preserving the confidentiality of internal commu-
nications in order to perform its duties under article II.”).
250 See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[A]pplication of
Executive privilege depends on a weighing of the public interest protected by the
privilege against the public interests that would be served by disclosure in a particular
case.” (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973))); ROZELL, supra
note 249, at 43 (“Congress’s and the public’s ‘right to know’ must be balanced with
the requirements of national security.”).
251 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309–10 (1981) (deferring to the Secretary
of State on a national security matter); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
(1953) (permitting the concealment of evidence by the executive branch for national
security interest); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 333 (1936)
(submitting to executive judgment on an economic issue in the national security con-
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necessary “for the President to carry out many of his constitutional
duties,” especially in the interrelated areas of national security and
foreign affairs.252
In terms of the need for confidential, candid deliberation and
secrecy, the interests of the public’s right to know must be balanced
against the president’s interest in receiving the best counsel to exe-
cute his constitutional duties.253  As presidential historian, Theodore
H. White, succinctly stated, “Executive privilege is a matter of vital
importance to the conduct of the American Presidency.  Unless the
President can talk frankly, and listen to frank advice, he cannot think
clearly enough to act effectively.”254  Arguably, “[i]f officers of the
executive branch believed that their confidential advice could eventu-
ally be disclosed, the quality of that advice would be seriously dam-
aged.”255  The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
secrecy as a prerequisite for frank communications and deliberations.
In the seminal executive privilege case, United States v. Nixon,256 the
Court held that “[t]he privilege is fundamental to the operation of
Government.”257
text); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Execu-
tive . . . [and it] is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”); In re Terrorist Attacks
on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570, 03 Civ. 6978(RCC), 2004 WL 1348996, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (“This Court defers to the judgment of the executive
branch with respect to issues of national security.”).
252 Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 541, 561 (2000); see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“Con-
gress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas.”); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be
published to the world.”).
253 See Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.
353 (1971) (statement of Averell Harriman, former ambassador to Great Britain and
the Soviet Union) (“The President is entitled to receive the frank views of his advisors
and therefore must be able to protect the personal or confidential nature of their
communications with him.”); id. at 320–21 (statement of William P. Bundy, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies) (testifying in support
of the need for secrecy as a precondition for “honesty, candor, courage, and frank-
ness within the executive branch”).
254 THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH 203 (1975).
255 Rozell, supra note 249, at 46–47. R
256 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
257 Id. at 708.
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Executive privilege has several parallels with Executive Trade
Secrets.  The role of the president as the chief executive of the coun-
try is in many ways similar to the role of a CEO of a corporation, espe-
cially a large complex corporation.258  In fact, President Calvin
Coolidge famously stated, “the business of America is business.”259
Furthermore, the need for secrecy as justification for executive privi-
lege in the political context is analogous to the need for secrecy as
justification for Executive Trade Secrets in the commercial context.
First, the national security rationale in the political context is logi-
cally similar to the economic advantage rationale in the business con-
text.260  The paramount importance of protecting the nation’s
general welfare by securing certain secrets is akin to the significance
of protecting a company’s economic advantage by safeguarding its
trade secrets from public disclosure.
Furthermore, the judicial proclivity for deference to presidential
decisions in the area of national security and the judicial proclivity for
deference to executive decisions in the area of business add another
layer of symmetry between executive privilege and Executive Trade
Secrets.  Courts do not extend such deferential courtesies to other
complex subjects like medicine or engineering.261  Courts, however,
appear to give special deference to executive decisions concerning
national security and business.
Second, the confidential deliberations rationale in the political
context is similar to the candid disclosure rationale in the business
context.  The president’s ability to receive frank and sage counsel in
matters of political governance is akin to a board or an executive’s
ability to receive candid advice in matters of corporate governance.
Absent legally protected secrecy, both political and business delibera-
tions at the highest levels would lack candor to the detriment of citi-
zens and shareholders, respectively, thereby, making it more difficult
258 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 282–83 (2010) (analogizing the president of the United
States. to the chief executive officer of a corporation); James Bennet, The Bush Years;
C.E.O., U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 14, 2001, at 24, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/01/14/magazine/the-bush-years-ceo-usa.html?pagewanted=print (report-
ing on the perception of President George W. Bush as the CEO of the country).
259 JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA 247 (2002).
260 See supra Part III.
261 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (inquiring as to why judges are permitted to judge contro-
versies involving engineering design but not business decisions); Bainbridge, supra
note 146, at 120 (“[N]o ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design judgment’ rule precludes judi- R
cial review of malpractice or product liability cases.”).
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for presidents to uphold their constitutional duties and executives to
uphold their fiduciary duties.
In addition to their symmetrical rationales, the challenges and
controversies relating to executive privileges also would be instructive
for Executive Trade Secrets.  Critiques of executive privilege are often
rooted in the public’s right to know and the fear of abuse.262  For
many, governmental secrecy and executive privilege are anathemas to
a free democratic society and political accountability.263  Moreover,
some fear that presidents may abuse executive privilege to cover up
inappropriate activities and embarrassing information.264  These argu-
ments are legitimate and must be carefully weighed by presidents and
courts in matters concerning executive privilege.
Similarly, arguments against Executive Trade Secrets will likely be
rooted in the investing public’s right to know and the fear of abuse.
Such arguments would also be legitimate and would require careful
consideration by firms, regulators, and courts.
In sum, executive secrecy in both the political and corporate con-
texts is frequently rife with controversies and challenges that must be
duly balanced against the benefits of secrecy for the sake of the coun-
try and its citizens, or the firm and its shareholders, as the case may
be.  Ultimately, the outcomes of such balancing in both the political
and corporate contexts will depend largely on the facts of each case.
Part IV introduced the theoretical framework of Executive Trade
Secrets as a mechanism to address the problems and tensions sur-
rounding executive disclosures.  Next, Part V will explore three key
implications of the introduced framework.
262 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN.  L.  REV.  1143, 1153–69 (1999) (challenging the legiti-
macy of executive privilege); Rozell, supra note 248, at 7–18 (enumerating some criti- R
ques of executive privilege such as, lacking constitutional foundation, public’s right to
know, and abuse of power). See generally RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974).
263 See MORTON HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET 2 (1977) (“Not only
has secrecy undermined the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and the electo-
rate, it has also led directly to substantial infringements of civil liberties.”); Rozell,
supra note 249, at 12–15 (surveying arguments against executive privilege based on R
the public’s right to know); Bruce Miroff, Secrecy and Spectacle: Reflections on the Dangers
of the Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 151, 157 (Paul Brace et al.
eds., 1989) (“[T]he American people cannot judge what they do not know.”).
264 See ROZELL, supra note 249, at 15–18 (chronicling misuses of executive privi-
lege); see also Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived? Secrecy and Conflict During the
Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 403 (2002) (alleging abuses of executive privilege in
the Nixon and Clinton administrations).
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V. KEY IMPLICATIONS OF EXECUTIVE TRADE SECRETS
A. A Shield to Protect or a Shield to Hide?
A concern about Executive Trade Secrets is that it can be used as
a malignant shield to hide all personal information about executives
from shareholders, in addition to being used as a benign shield to
protect the economically-sensitive business secrets of a firm.  While
this concern is legitimate, the law provides a number of safeguards
against abuse and the creation of an omnipotent, villainous shield.
First, corporate law states that executives owe fiduciary duties to
their firms, including the duties of candor and disclosure.265  There-
fore, executives arguably must disclose material or potentially material
information—personal or otherwise—to their boards.  Executive
Trade Secrets encourages such internal disclosure, which then allows
boards to decide whether external disclosure is appropriate and
whether reasonable efforts need to be taken to protect the informa-
tion if it is deemed of economic value to the firm.266
The disclosure decision concerning an executive’s private infor-
mation is often a complex and sensitive business decision.  That deci-
sion, like most other business decisions made on behalf of the
shareholders, ultimately rests with a firm’s directors and executives,267
who are best equipped to make such judgments.268  Shareholders who
265 See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (finding a duty to not
make materially misleading or false statements); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286–87 (Del. 1994) (discussing the personal liability of directors
that fail to disclose information); Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114
(Del. 1992) (“As the majority shareholder, [Shell] bears the burden of showing com-
plete disclosure of all material facts relevant to a minority shareholders’ decision
whether to accept the short-form merger consideration or seek an appraisal.”);
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992) (holding that directors have the duty to
disclose material facts at a shareholder meeting); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383
A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (finding a duty of full disclosure in the context of actions
requiring shareholder approval); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the
Duty of Candor, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 300 (2006) (concluding that senior officers
possess a duty to inform); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corpo-
rate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1652 (2005) (“[Officers’] core
responsibilities are supplemented by duties of good conduct, disclosure, and
obedience.”).
266 For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see supra Part IV.C.
267 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010) (“[The corporation] shall be man-
aged by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); Bainbridge, supra note
146, at 105 (“[T]he vast majority of corporate decisions are made by the board of R
directors or by managers acting under delegated authority.”).
268 See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 33, at 327–28 (arguing that decisions about disclo- R
sure of executive private facts should be made by the board of directors); Eric A.
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own the firm do not have managerial rights or powers.269  This is
inherent in the fundamental agency relationship between corporate
managers and corporate shareholders, as players in the modern
corporation.270
While some uneasiness may exist about granting such deference
to the judgment of directors and other executives, given the personal
nature of the information,271 courts historically have not substituted
their judgment for the judgment of business people.272  The law gen-
erally presumes that directors act in the interests of their sharehold-
ers.273  However, this judicial deference is not absolute.  Courts have
not abstained in overruling the business judgment of directors or
executives in cases where they held that such parties have acted in a
grossly negligent manner, in bad faith, or have breached their duty of
Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 749, 758 (2000) (“[C]ourts have trouble understanding the simplest of business
relationships.  This is not surprising.  Judges must be generalists, but they usually have
narrow backgrounds in a particular field of the law.”).
269 See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 816 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A basic premise of
corporate governance under Delaware law is that the directors, rather than the share-
holders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”); ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112–16 (rev.
ed. 1967) (describing the separation of ownership and management in corporations);
Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 105 (“Shareholders, who are said to ‘own’ the firm, R
have virtually no power to control either its day-to-day operation or its long-term poli-
cies.” (footnotes omitted)).
270 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999) (“[C]orporations are little more than bundles of
assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and officers
(agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.”); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980) (discussing the separation
of risk-bearing and management in firms).
271 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 414 (2005) (suggesting
that directors worry little about liability for breaches of their duty of care because they
are personally protected by corporate mechanisms such as insurance and indemnifi-
cation); Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 33, at 765–71 (opining that “[t]he
existing disclosure regime places too much discretion in the hands of executive
officers”).
272 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[J]udges
are not business experts.”); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888) (“[C]ourts
will not interfere unless the [directors’] powers have been illegally or unconscien-
tiously executed; or unless it be made to appear that the acts were fraudulent or
collusive, and destructive of the rights of the stockholders.”).
273 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end.”).
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loyalty to the firm.274  Therefore, fiduciary obligations under corpo-
rate law serve as a safeguard against a sinister shield.
Second, securities law mandates that firms disclose only material
information in addition to other specified line-item disclosures.  The
truth of the matter is that many, if not most, private facts of executives
are often not relevant or material to investors.275  “Not all information
that is interesting to investors and analysts is material to the financial
condition of a company.”276  Additionally, securities law’s prohibitions
against insider trading help protect against insiders and others from
illicitly profiting with their exclusive knowledge of material private
information relating to executives.277  Therefore, the concern of cre-
ating an over-inclusive, sinister shield, while legitimate, is less worri-
some given the narrow scope of relevant, private information worthy
274 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“[A]
decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts
unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under the business judgment rule there is
no protection for directors who have made ‘an unintelligent or unadvised judg-
ment.’” (quoting Mitchell v. Highland Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del.
1933))).
275 See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]
corporation is not required to disclose a fact merely because a reasonable investor
would very much like to know that fact.”); Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 969
(1st Cir. 1992) (“The mere fact that an investor might find information interesting or
desirable is not sufficient to satisfy the materiality requirement.”).  It can also be
argued that investors may not be able to properly process voluminous and frequent
disclosures of private information that they are interested in without any meaningful
benchmarks or guidance. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities
Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 336–49 (2011) (discussing various cognitive limita-
tions that affect investors); see also Abril & Olaza´bal, supra note 33, at 1586 R
(“[D]isclosure of such health information would unfairly tax investors with the
responsibility of acquiring medical knowledge to be able to interpret corporate
disclosures.”).
276 David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial
Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 142 (2007); see also United States v. Heron, 525
F. Supp. 2d 729, 751–52 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that just because investors may “want
to know” some information, does not render that information material for securities
law purposes).
277 See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (“[A] corporate
insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first
disclosed all material inside information known to him.”); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (1968) (opining that “anyone in possession of material inside
information” must either “disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he choses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
inside information remains undisclosed”).
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of disclosure consideration under the Executive Trade Secrets
framework.
Third, in addition to the safeguards of corporate law and securi-
ties law, trade secrets law offers protections against a sinister shield.
Recall that Executive Trade Secrets, as conceptualized here, only
applies to private executive information that (1) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, for the firm from not being gen-
erally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts by the firm that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.278  Arguably, only a
limited number of private facts concerning a limited number of exec-
utives would satisfy the first prong, which would serve as a channeling
mechanism.279  Moreover, even when the first prong is satisfied, a firm
could still decide that the economic value gained from the secret
knowledge of such information is not worth costly efforts—financial
or otherwise—to maintain its secrecy.280
It is also crucial to note that trade secrets are not absolutely pro-
tected from disclosure.  Third parties can undertake various efforts to
reveal trade secrets, and government regulators can compel disclosure
as well.281  For example, congressional investigators can request trade
secrets from firms under the Freedom of Information Act or through
congressional subpoenas.282  Similarly, enterprising, investigative
278 The basis of this definition is rooted in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s defini-
tion of a trade secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
538 (2005).  For a more robust description of Executive Trade Secrets, see supra Part
IV.A.
279 See Lemley, supra note 192, at 313 (arguing that the secrecy requirement of R
trade secrets serves as a channeling and gatekeeping function for firms when deciding
what to disclose); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2007) (opining that the secrecy requirement of trade secrets
law leads to less overall secrecy because of the existence of legal protection).
280 For example, a firm could decide that securing the economic value of a certain
private fact of its executive is not worth the regulatory and public scrutiny of
nondisclosure.
281 See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953) (opining that a trade
secret can be legitimately revealed “from a study of the expired patent and plaintiffs’
publicly marketed product”). Contra Robert Block, Bush Antiterror Plans Irk Big Busi-
ness, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at A4 (discussing how anti-terror laws permit govern-
ment agencies to request for confidential business information); Do Hedge Funds Hold
‘Trade Secrets’?, supra note 230 (discussing the SEC compelling the disclosure of a
hedge fund’s proprietary information).
282 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2006) (“This section [of the Freedom of Information
Act concerning the exemption of trade secrets from public request] is not authority
to withhold information from Congress.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78x(e)(2) (2006) (stating the
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reporters can legitimately disclose valuable commercial secrets and
private information about newsworthy figures.
Ultimately, while concerns about Executive Trade Secrets creat-
ing an inappropriate shield for hiding executive information are legit-
imate, the laws of corporations, securities, and trade secrets provide
meaningful safeguards for the interests of the investing public.
B. Better Executive Pools & More Public Firms
Two significant, interrelated positive consequences of Executive
Trade Secrets are (1) better executive pools and (2) more public
firms.  By creating a safer pathway, Executive Trade Secrets encour-
ages individuals with sensitive private issues to be more inclined to
become public company executives, thereby, expanding the pool of
qualified candidates for executive positions.  Under the same logic,
entrepreneurs with sensitive private issues who lead private companies
may be more inclined to become public companies if they knew that
some of their private information could be legitimately and sensibly
safeguarded in the business context.
The current executive disclosure practices and the intrusive
media environment surrounding prominent public company execu-
tives may deter qualified private individuals from wanting to serve as
executives and deter private companies from wanting to go public.283
Under the current framework, qualified candidates with sensitive pri-
vate issues may be reluctant to subject themselves to the scrutiny and
disclosures that comes with being a public company executive.  These
sensitive private issues could include matters such as health condi-
tions, familial problems, domestic disputes, religious affiliations, sex-
ual orientation, and personal finances.
The deterrent burdens of disclosure and publications are not
unique to the corporate context.  In the political and judicial arenas,
many qualified individuals remove themselves from consideration for
political office or judicial appointments for fear of losing their privacy
as a part of an increasingly intrusive electoral and confirmation
same for SEC filings); 21 U.S.C. § 331-(j) (2006) (stating the same under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
283 See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 86–89 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/
pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (discussing how cumbersome and intrusive securities regula-
tion could deter companies from conducting initial public offerings in the United
States); see also Lin, supra note 33, at 421 (“That cost, while unquantifiable in financial R
terms, may be significant enough to have a chilling effect on qualified, but very pri-
vate, people who are considering becoming public company executives . . . .”).
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processes.284  As a result of the diminished talent pool, the public is
deprived of superior public servants.285
While the political and judicial spheres offer few easy solutions to
the problems of public disclosures of privacy facts,286 Executive Trade
Secrets offers a better path for the business sphere.  Executive Trade
Secrets alleviates some of these problems by creating a pragmatic
framework for qualified private individuals to manage public firms
without completely abdicating their personal privacy or breaching
their duties.  This will likely encourage more qualified individuals to
enter the pool for executive positions and encourage private company
executives with sensitive personal issues to consider an initial public
offering.
The expansion of executive talent pools and the growth of public
firms are critically important to shareholder wealth creation and eco-
nomic progress.287  First, talented executives are often the key differ-
ence between a successful firm and a failed firm.288  By creating
conditions that encourage the expansion of the executive talent pool,
Executive Trade Secrets increases the likelihood for firms to get better
managers.  Second, access to the public capital markets is often a key
to the growth and success of startup enterprises.  Startup businesses
and other private firms often “go public” because the public capital
markets represent one of the best sources of financing for talent
284 For a definitive exposition on this matter, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIR-
MATION MESS (1994) (discussing problems and solutions of the federal appointments
process); see also Jackie Calmes, For a Washington Job, Be Prepared to Tell All, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2008, at A1 (discussing the invasive nature of the Obama administration’s job
application); Deborah Solomon, Top Treasury Candidates Pull Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,
2009, at A3 (reporting on the withdrawal of political office candidates “in part
because of the long vetting process, which had dragged on for weeks and included
several rounds of intense questioning”).
285 See CARTER, supra note 284, at 3–10 (arguing that the government is deprived
of qualified individuals because of an increasingly intrusive media culture); Mark
Landler, Clinton Says Candidate for Aid Agency is Tangled in Vetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2009, at A10 (noting that individuals declined to be considered for federal posts
“because the financial and personal reporting requirements were so onerous”).
286 See CARTER, supra note 284, at 187–206 (articulating various workable, but diffi-
cult to implement proposals to fix the federal appointments process).
287 See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 283, at 36 (opining on the importance of
IPOs to economic growth).
288 See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduci-
ary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1105 (2009) (“Undeniably, corporate executives wield
great power and are critical to company success, and they generally play central roles
in corporate failure and scandal as well.” (footnotes omitted)); see also SONNENFELD,
supra note 94, at 3–9 (providing examples of failing companies being turned around R
by talented executives).
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recruitment, personnel retention, business expansion, and research
and development.289  By removing a sensitive hurdle for some enter-
prising individuals, Executive Trade Secrets, makes it easier for busi-
nesses to contemplate an initial public offering.
In sum, Executive Trade Secrets incentivizes shareholder wealth-
creation and economic growth by expanding executive talent pools
and encouraging private firms to become public ones.
C. The (Further) Commoditization of Personal Privacy
A final key implication of Executive Trade Secrets is that it
expands the contemporary practice of commoditizing personal pri-
vacy rights and private facts because a subject’s trade secrets protec-
tion arises, in part, from its proprietary property interests.290  The
conceptualization of executive private facts as economically valuable
trade secrets further expands on the macroeconomic trend of privacy
commoditization.291  Such an expansion advances and challenges
289 See, e.g., DRAHO, supra note 56, at 1 (“The IPO can be used to raise capital for R
expansion of operations, increase liquidity for the shareholders, improve the com-
pany’s reputation and to create a valuable currency—the stock—that can be used to
make acquisitions and compensate employees.”); SIMON C. PARKER, THE LIFE CYCLE OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 571 (2006) (noting that IPOs are more prevalent as a
method of capital raising in “R&D intensive industries and industries with significant
intangible resources”). See generally Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public?,
53 J. FIN. 27, 61 (1998) (finding that companies conduct IPOs as a way to replenish
corporate accounts).
290 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 985, 1001–04 (1984) (opining on
whether compelled disclosure of trade secrets amounts to a government takings of
private property); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under
the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2004) (denoting certain trade secrets
as property); Lemley, supra note 192, at 324–26 (discussing how trade secrets can be R
considered property); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Pri-
vacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26–41 (1996) (dis-
cussing the relationship between privacy and property); Richard S. Murphy, Property
Rights in Personal Information, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2384 (1996) (“[I]nformation, is
property.”).
291 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 214, at 1134 (“[A] creation of new property R
rights seems almost inevitable.  Granting individuals property rights in their data
would seem consistent with this general trend.” (footnotes omitted)); Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2057 (2004) (“A
strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United States,
and individual Americans are already participating in the commodification of their
personal data.”); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to
Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 897, 897–98 (1988) (discussing
the need for corporations to secure legal protections in the face of “the emerging
importance of information as a commodity”); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 415–16 (2003) (“Although Courts today
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our traditional understanding of privacy as only an individual
right.292
As previously discussed, issues concerning executive disclosure
arise, in part, because of advances in information technology; Execu-
tive Trade Secrets serves as a partial legal response to these new
issues.293  This action-reaction dynamic between technology and pri-
vacy concerning executive disclosures is consistent with other
responses in privacy law to new technology.  Historically, the advent of
new technology has often disrupted conventional and legal under-
standings of privacy, thereby, requiring new legal conceptions.294
“Privacy law has traditionally developed in tandem with technology
. . . .”295  The law has often played tortoise to technology’s hare.296
The proliferation of the telephone, for example, in the 1900s pushed
the evolution of our expectations and conceptions of privacy.  In
recognize trade secrets as ‘property’ many commentators find that this amounts to
placing a round peg in a square hole.” (footnotes omitted)).
292 There exist many articulations and understandings of the right to privacy. See,
e.g., 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 1 (2005) (outlining privacy as the right of a person to
be free from unwarranted publicity); ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS 34 (1988)
(“[P]rivacy denotes a degree of inaccessibility of persons, their mental states, and
information about them to the senses and surveillance devices of others.”); SISSELA
BOK, SECRETS 10–11 (1983) (“[P]rivacy [i]s the condition of being protected from
unwanted access by others—either physical access, personal information, or atten-
tion.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980)
(“[P]rivacy is a limitation of others’ access to an individual.”); Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 4, at 193 (articulating the right to privacy for the first time). R
293 For a more detailed discussion about how advances in information technology
have affected the influence and privacy of executives, see supra Part I.C.
294 See Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of Opportunity
for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921, 922–24 (2006) (discussing shifts in privacy
norms from introduction of new technologies); Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Pri-
vacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 283 (2003) (“As digital technology
renders obsolete the theories on which the laws are based, the legal protections them-
selves become at best incomplete and at worst perverse.”); Michael H. Shapiro, Is
Bioethics Broke? On the Idea of Ethics and Law “Catching Up” with Technology, 33 IND. L.
REV. 17 (1999) (discussing whether the law needs to “catch up” to science and tech-
nology); Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, Web Outruns Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2011, at A1 (discussing how the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
“is outdated” and needs updating).
295 DeVries, supra note 294, at 283.
296 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race To Keep Up With
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often
stated that the law lags behind technology.  As technology changes and creates new
possibilities, lawyers and legal scholars struggle to deal with the implications.”); Law-
rence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501,
514–22 (1999) (discussing how the creation of cyberspace demands new legal
conceptions).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 56 20-APR-12 10:47
966 notre dame law review [vol. 87:3
1928, the Supreme Court held that telephone wiretaps did not
amount to an unreasonable breach of one’s privacy.297  Nearly four
decades later, in Katz v. United States,298 the Court’s position changed,
when it held that there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
phone conversations.299
More recently, the proliferation of the Internet and digital
devices in the twenty-first century has again pushed and changed our
expectations and conceptions of privacy not just for executives but for
all individuals.300  Modern advances in information technology have
made privacy, specifically informational privacy,301 both scarce and
valuable.302  In 1966, Justice William O. Douglas presciently lamented
that, “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy . . . .”303  Today, a
multi-billion dollar industry exists to facilitate the aggregation and
analysis of private information for profit.304  Today, “[o]ur wherea-
297 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
298 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
299 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
300 See STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 243, 245, 250 (2004)
(“There is a burgeoning privacy crisis caused in large part to the explosive growth of
the Internet.”); Bernstein, supra note 294, at 931–43 (discussing the impact of the
Internet on changes in privacy norms); see also DeVries, supra note 294, at 285 (“Digi-
tal technology—computing, databases, the Internet, mobile communications, and the
like—thus calls for further evolution of privacy rights, both conceptually and in
law.”); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Informa-
tion Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001) (“The small details that were once
captured in dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now preserved forever in the
digital minds of computers, vast databases with fertile fields of personal data.”).
301 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing informational pri-
vacy interests); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining information
privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others”); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1205 (1998) (defining information privacy as “an individual’s claim to control
the terms under which personal information—information identifiable to the individ-
ual—is acquired, disclosed, and used” (quoting INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995), available at http://
aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/niiprivp.htm).
302 See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 109 (2008) (“Information
exchange is the currency of the modern economy.”); Samuelson, supra note 214, at R
1126 (“Information privacy is a scarce commodity in cyberspace.”).
303 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
304 See Beales & Muris, supra note 302, at 109 (“A multi-billion dollar industry with
dozens of firms compiles and resells information.”); William J. Fenrich, Common Law
Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 959–64
(1996) (documenting the personal data collection industry in America); Schwartz,
supra note 291, at 2056 (“The monetary value of personal data is large and still grow-
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bouts, our financial transactions, our uses of the World Wide Web,
and countless other data routinely register in the automated con-
sciousness of corporate and state bureaucracies.”305  In the last few
decades alone, new technology (along with other factors) has seem-
ingly transformed the concept of privacy from merely an individual
right into also a property right.306
This property conception of privacy is filled with promise and
peril both in terms of Executive Trade Secrets and in general.  As a
practical example of its promise, the commoditization of private facts
arguably has made commerce more efficient.  Digital cookies that
store consumer preferences in their web browsers, for instance, has
made it easier for consumers to find goods online that satisfy their
preferences, and easier for firms to market to those consumers.307
At the same time, the collection of such data is often without
the informed consent or knowledge of individuals,308 and may
ing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from this trend.”); Ashlee
Vance, Data Analytics: Crunching the Future, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2011, at 71
(reporting on the proliferation of data aggregation and data analysis for commercial
purposes.).
305 James B. Rule, The Whole World Is Watching, 22 DEMOCRACY J. 58, 59 (2011).
306 Warren and Brandeis presciently saw the potential of privacy as property in
their seminal work. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193 (“[T]he term ‘prop-
erty’ has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangi-
ble.”).  For a general survey of privacy as a property right, see generally Mell, supra
note 290, at 9–10 (“[T]here is a general consensus that individuals do have a right to
some degree of privacy, even in the electronic wilderness.”); Murphy, supra note 290,
at 2381 (discussing a property right to “informational privacy”); Samuelson, supra
note 214, at 1125 (conceptualizing privacy as intellectual property); Schwartz, supra R
note 291, at 2055–58 (seeking a model for propertization of personal data that safe-
guards information privacy).
307 See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 129 (2007) (“More and more information is
digitalized in binary bytes.  Mail is now email.  From health care files to real estate and
legal filings, electronic records are everywhere.”); Beales & Muris, supra note 302, at
112 (describing how consumer data collection has resulted in more effective market-
ing); Kang, supra note 301, at 1199 (“[T]he data collected in these various domains
can be aggregated to produce telling profiles of who we are, as revealed by what we do
and say. . . . The information we generate as a by-product of this activity is quite
valuable.  The private sector seeks to exploit it commercially, but individuals resist.”).
308 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
395, 476 (2000) (“[M]ost users are not even aware that the web sites they visit collect
user information, and even if they are cognizant of that possibility, they have little
conception of how personal data might be processed.”); Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1195
(2002) (warning of the growing threat to privacy arising from “increased access and
aggregation” of private information); Editorial, Protecting Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2010, at WK7 (“Most [people] don’t understand how much information they
are sharing about their online lives.”).
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be subject to breaches and violations of commercial norms and
laws.309
On a more fundamental level, a property conception of privacy
offers the promise that individuals can better capture and bargain for
the rents that other market participants gain from their private infor-
mation.310  Nonprofit and for-profit enterprises are both attempting
to create workable mechanisms that would allow individuals to better
extract monetary gains from their personal data.311
Additionally, a property conception of privacy offers the promise
of some of the robust protections afforded to traditional property.312
For example, by conceptualizing certain private facts of executives as
trade secrets, it affords such private facts some of the added protec-
tions afforded to chattel such as quasi-intellectual property protec-
tions, in conjunction with traditional privacy protections.
On the other hand, privacy as property presents some perils
rooted in notions of alienability and morality.  Personal information
309 See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that
the sale of consumer credit reports under certain circumstances violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act); PRESIDENT’S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, COMBATING IDENTITY
THEFT 11 (2007), available at www.identitytheft.gov/reports/StrategicPlan.pdf (dis-
cussing the cost and prevalence of identity theft); Beales & Muris, supra note 302, at
120–25 (surveying various statistics on data breaches and identity theft).
310 See Frank  H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace  and  the  Law  of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 212–13 (1996) (advocating for the recognition of electronic  property
rights to encourage bargaining for rents); Samuelson, supra note 214, at 1126–30 R
(discussing the economic appeal of conceptualizing privacy and property); Somni
Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Personal Data’s Value?  Facebook Is Set to Find Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1 (reporting on Facebook profiting from the personal data of
its users).  However, it can legitimately be argued that the creation of such property
rights in personal information can lead to an inefficient market with serious negative
externalities. See Mark A. Lemley, Private Property: A Comment on Professor Samuelson’s
Contribution, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2000) (“If we want privacy, we must be
willing to accept the fact that there is no good ‘market solution’ and endorse some
government regulation of the behavior of data collectors . . . . it is not a ‘free market’
solution, because we cannot expect the market to allocate those billions of rights
efficiently.”).
311 See Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a Price on Their Personal Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at B3; Carol Matlack, Who Do You Trust More: Facebook or a
Bank, BUS. WK., Jan. 16, 2012, at 36 (“Now SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the nonprofit global cooperative that han-
dles wire transfers between financial institutions is working on a system that would let
Web surfers store and manage their own data.”).
312 See id. at 1132 (“Thus, however intuitively powerful the notion of property
rights in one’s data may be, it is clear that in the United States the existence of some
legally protectable interests in personal data in certain circumstances is not equivalent
to a legal rule that a person has a property interest in one’s personal data.”).
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presents particular problems relating to the fundamental property
tenet of alienability.313  For an executive whose personal information
has been deemed a trade secret, who owns and controls the use of
such information—the firm, the executive, or both of them?314  How
can one secure the private information of an individual after purchas-
ing it to the exclusion of others?  Who can exploit it?  Who owns that
private information?315  For chattel, these questions are easier; for pri-
vate personal information, they are much more difficult.316
Additionally, conceptualizing and commoditizing privacy as prop-
erty may threaten our moral sensibilities and lead to dangerous conse-
quences.317  What happens to an individual or executive’s personhood
once they have sold off their personal information?  What is a “fair”
bargain for one’s personal information and privacy?318  What is to pre-
vent the commoditization of other privacy rights including decisional
privacy matters such as marriage and voting?  Ultimately, these are
complicated and important questions for modernity, where personal
313 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“The right
to exclude others is generally ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetra v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))); see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Informa-
tion Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295–1302 (2000) (discussing problems concern-
ing alienability of treating personal information as property).
314 See Rule, supra note 305, at 69 (lamenting the permanent alienability of an
individual’s private information).
315 See Lev Grossman, 2010 Person of the Year Mark Zuckerberg, TIME, Dec. 27, 2010,
at 44, 52–56 (raising similar privacy concerns relating to Facebook).
316 Despite these difficulties, a large number of courts and legal scholars have
accepted the conception of trade secrets as a property. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MIL-
GRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 73–98 (2006) (cataloguing cases where trade secrets are rec-
ognized as property); see also Teller v. Teller, 53 P.3d 240, 247–49 (Haw. 2002)
(finding trade secrets as a property right in relation to distribution of marital assets).
Even one of the earliest trade secrets cases acquiesced to the conception of trade
secrets as property. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459–60 (1868) (“In this
court, it is settled that a secret art is a legal subject of property . . . .”).
317 See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 147 (2004) (raising concerns about the “over-propertization of information
in the digital age”); Samuelson, supra note 214, at 1142–47 (discussing the risks of R
treating the right to privacy as a property from a moral and civil liberties perspective);
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2000) (“Recognizing property rights in personally-identified data
risks enabling more, not less, trade and producing less, not more, privacy.”).
318 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace
Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 763 (2000)
(“[P]roperty rights in personal data may systematically lead to bad bargains—and
ones in areas of great social importance.”).
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facts and privacy are frequently treated like chattel.319  There are no
easy answers; instead, the promises and perils of privacy as property
must be carefully considered and balanced by individuals, executives,
and policymakers.320
Executive Trade Secrets, like previous legal reactions to the
impact of new information technology on privacy, in part, is a legal
response to the modern reality of executive privacy, a partial legal
response to the evolving nature of privacy as both an individual right
and a form of property.321  In the final analysis, Executive Trade
Secrets does not fully capture the promises of privacy as both right
and property for firms and executives, nor does it fully shield them
from the perils of this Janus conception of privacy.  What it does, or
what it hopes to do is to advance the discourse on privacy as form of
protectable, secret property as a way to address anew problematic
issues concerning executive disclosures.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a straightforward claim.  It claimed that
the law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets.  Namely, it
accused the law of favoring business secrets over the secrets of busi-
ness people, thereby creating a paradox of secrets with complicated
consequences for firms, executives, and investors.  This Article then
documented the disclosure obligations of firms and their executives,
and explained how these obligations lead to legal fault-lines and
inconsistent practices.  Specifically, it highlighted the tensions under
319 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1152 (2002)
(“Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging information with
third parties, such as phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies,
merchants, and so on.  Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would
mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”).
320 See, e.g., Beales & Muris, supra note 302, at 135 (“Wise choices about privacy
protection can be made only after careful consideration of the particular uses of
information, the problems they may pose for consumers, and the benefits those uses
may offer to other consumers and the economy as a whole.”); Schwartz, supra note
291, at 2094 (proposing a “hybrid inalienability” model for trading personal informa-
tion); see also Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1554 (2000)
(“[T]here is no good market solution [for private information based in property law]
. . . .”); Lipton, supra note 317, at 144 (“Increasingly, propertization of information
. . . leads to obvious concerns about appropriately balancing competing interests in
valuable information.”); Rowe, supra note 185, 826–28 (proposing a multi-factored R
balancing approach to considering the disclosure of trade secrets to governmental
agencies).
321 See generally Shapiro, supra note 294, at 17 (explicating on the need for timely
legal responses to technological advances).
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the cross-cutting obligations in the laws concerning securities, corpo-
rations, and privacy.  To address those tensions and conflicts, this Arti-
cle moved from the laws of secret-telling to the laws of secret-keeping.
This pivot started with an overview of trade secrets law.  Then, using
the foundation of trade secrets, this Article introduced the concept of
Executive Trade Secrets as the key to unlocking the paradox of secrets
and addressing the problems of executive disclosures.  This pivot con-
cluded with a discussion of three key implications of Executive Trade
Secrets—the limitations of its shield, its larger impact on commerce,
and where it resides in the modern discourse on privacy
commoditization.
In the end, it must be confessed that this Article does not per-
fectly resolve all the issues and tensions concerning executive disclo-
sures.  Instead, it offers Executive Trade Secrets as a pragmatic
theoretical framework for working through those issues, as a new con-
struct to re-think, re-imagine, and re-examine how one should under-
stand business secrets and the secrets of business people.  In a world
where privacy has grown both more valuable and more vulnerable,
Executive Trade Secrets challenges our traditional understandings of
privacy and business secrets.  And in re-thinking about how best to
protect the secrets and privacy of firms and their executives, it will
perhaps cause us to re-think how we could better safeguard our
secrets and our privacy against advances in modernity.
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